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We study how the interplay of disclosure and regulation shapes capital allocation in reward 
crowdfunding. Using data from Kickstarter, the largest online reward crowdfunding platform, 
we show that, even in the absence of clear regulation and enforcement mechanisms, 
disclosure helps entrepreneurs access capital for their projects and bolsters engagement with 
potential project backers, consistent with the notion that disclosure mitigates moral hazard. 
We further document that, subsequent to a change in Kickstarter’s terms of use that increases 
the threat of consumer litigation, the association between project funding and disclosure 
becomes stronger. This evidence suggests that consumer protection regulation enhances the 
perceived credibility of disclosure. We find the effect of the change in terms of use to be 
more pronounced in states with stricter consumer protection regulations. Taken together, our 
findings yield important insights on the role of disclosure, as well as on the potential effects 
of increased regulation on crowdfunding platforms. 
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We study how the interplay of disclosure and regulation shapes capital allocation in 
reward crowdfunding. Crowdfunding, essentially a type of microfinance, has experienced an 
unprecedented growth over the last few years, becoming an important driver of economic and 
financial development. The World Bank has estimated that crowdfunding could reach U.S. 
$90 billion by 2020, surpassing venture capital and angel capital as a means of financing.1 
While much of this growth has been spurred by lending-based crowdfunding, an interesting 
phenomenon has been the strong emergence of reward crowdfunding, in which project 
creators (i.e., entrepreneurs) promise future in-kind rewards in exchange for backer 
contributions. On reward crowdfunding platforms, project backers represent “hybrid” 
stakeholders, in between investors and consumers (Belleflame et al., 2015).  
The hybrid nature of project backers renders their contractual claims difficult to 
regulate and enforce in case of contract breach by creators. Reward crowdfunding does not 
involve the offering of securities and therefore does not fall under the U.S. securities laws or 
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As such, SEC rules 
specifically designed for equity crowdfunding do not apply.2 Reward crowdfunding platforms 
also disclaim any liability, stating that they act as mere intermediaries. As it is often the case 
for evolving technologies, the emergence of reward crowdfunding led to a regulatory limbo, 
in which backers were initially left without much recourse. 
A regulatory void is particularly troublesome given the adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems that characterize these markets. Information asymmetries between creators 
and backers regarding creator ability and project quality (adverse selection), coupled with the 
inability of backers to induce creator effort and ensure that pledged funds are not diverted for 
                                                            
1 Forbes, Trends Show Crowdfunding to Surpass VC in 2016, June 9, 2015 (Available at: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2015/06/09/trends-show-crowdfunding-to-surpass-vc-in-2016/). 
2 The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, signed into law on April 5, 2012, legalizes equity 




personal consumption (moral hazard), are in fact inherent to crowdfunding (Agrawal et al., 
2014; Belleflamme et al., 2015). Project creators may rely on disclosure to signal their ability 
and project quality (e.g., Grossman, 1981). However, the lack of clear regulation and 
oversight in the early years of reward crowdfunding, the absence of a trustworthy and 
independent third-party (e.g., an auditor) that certifies the information disclosed by creators, 
and the one-time nature of most of these transactions (many creators access these markets 
only once) may render disclosure not credible. In these markets, in fact, creators can easily 
engage in cheap talk.3 For example, when they provide voluntary disclosures about the 
project and themselves with the aim of enticing backers into pledging funds, they can oversell 
the project or, in extreme circumstances, communicate false information in bad faith.4  
In this paper, we examine two main questions. First, does (voluntary) disclosure 
facilitate contracting in reward crowdfunding, or is it mainly perceived as cheap talk? 
Second, to what extent does an increase in regulatory oversight enhance the perceived 
credibility of disclosure?  
We shed light on the above questions by exploiting a widely publicized rule change on 
Kickstarter, the world leading reward crowdfunding platform. On September 19, 2014, 
Kickstarter announced that it would change its terms of use to clarify the nature of the 
contract between backers and creators.5 This change, which was aimed at alleviating moral 
hazard, essentially strengthened the contractual position of backers by explicitly requiring 
creators to fulfill their obligation to deliver the promised rewards (or refund pledges) and by 
clearly spelling out the possibility of legal action against creators. The main mechanism 
                                                            
3 Stocken (2000) develops a model in which managers can make unverifiable disclosures to investors about the 
payoffs of a project and shows that, in a single-period game, managers do not make any informative disclosures 
in equilibrium. 
4 Project disclosures may, instead, be truthful. Gigler (1994) develops a model in which proprietary costs, and 
firms’ opposing incentives to disclose positive (negative) information to investors (competitors) may render 
disclosures credible. Agrawal et al. (2014) highlight other mechanisms that can lead to truthful disclosure in the 
context of crowdfunding, and specifically the role of crowd due diligence. There are, in fact, typically many 
more (and more varied) individuals reviewing a given project than in a traditional financing setting.  
5 As Kickstarter typically calls its terms of use “rules,” we refer to the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use 




through which such legal action may take place is consumer protection regulation, which is 
aimed at protecting consumers from “unfair and deceptive trade practices” and significantly 
varies in stringency across U.S. states. While consumer protection regulation was already in 
place to protect “traditional” consumers, the September 2014 rule change brought the 
possibility of legal action to the attention of creators and backers, thereby shifting substantial 
contractual risk from backers to creators. This effectively altered the perception of consumer 
protection law applicability in the context of Kickstarter given that in 2012 (i.e., prior to the 
rule change) Kickstarter had emphasized that they are not a “store” precisely to limit their 
own legal exposure.6 
In our empirical analysis, we first examine the association between disclosure and 
project funding to provide initial evidence on the extent of disclosure credibility on the 
platform. We find that disclosure (measured as either the length of a project’s campaign pitch 
or the length of a project’s risks and challenges section) exhibits a positive and robust 
association with the amount pledged and the probability of a project being funded, which 
suggests that backers take creator disclosures into account when deciding to make a pledge.  
Next, we turn to the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use announced on September 19, 
2014. The cross-sectional variation in consumer protection stringency across states allows us 
to use a research design in the spirit of a generalized difference-in-differences (DiD) to gauge 
the differential effect of this change on the perceived credibility of disclosure. Our 
identification strategy effectively compares disclosure credibility (i.e., the association 
between project success and disclosure) before and after the rule change by looking at 
differential responses across states, depending on the varying degrees of stringency in their 
pre-existing consumer protection laws. Our identifying assumption is that, in the absence of 
the rule change, states with different levels of consumer protection would exhibit similar 
                                                            





trends in disclosure credibility (i.e., parallel trends). We assess the validity of this assumption 
by testing for differences in pre-treatment trends and find that, before the rule change, the 
association between disclosure and both the likelihood that a project is funded and the 
amount of funds pledged to a project exhibits similar trends across states with varying 
degrees of consumer protection stringency. After the rule change, disclosure credibility 
experiences a sharp and persistent increase in states with stricter consumer protection 
regulation. We conduct a battery of sensitivity tests to rule out alternative explanations, 
including a county-level analysis in which we restrict our sample to contiguous counties in 
different states, a test that relies on shorter windows surrounding the event date, and an 
analysis employing different fixed effects structures to absorb the potentially confounding 
effect of state-level time-varying unobservable factors. 
Moreover, we examine alternative measures of project success, such as the number of 
(new and returning) backers and the level of backer engagement. The evidence from these 
tests is also consistent with disclosure playing a stronger role in facilitating contracting 
between backers and creators in states with stricter consumer protection following the rule 
change. 
Further, we conduct cross-sectional tests to explore heterogeneity in treatment effects 
and find that the increase in the perceived credibility of disclosure varies with litigation risk. 
Specifically, the effect of the rule change on the project success-disclosure relation is stronger 
when litigation risk is likely to be higher, namely when project rewards are larger, when 
confidence in courts is higher, and, to some extent, when courts have a lower caseload.  
Our evidence also suggests that the increase in disclosure credibility is not explained by 
backers increasingly falling for cheap talk after the rule change but, rather, by an 
improvement in the attributes of disclosure and in the association between disclosure and 




easier to read, and rely more on legal terms and quantitative information in states with stricter 
consumer protection regulation. 
Finally, we show that creators face direct and indirect costs of disclosure. Consistent 
with the argument that disclosure may reveal proprietary information, we find that, following 
the rule change, creators of more innovative projects increase their disclosures to a lesser 
extent than creators of less innovative projects. Furthermore, in line with the idea that 
disclosure may increase the cost of communicating with backers, we show that, after the rule 
change, disclosure is associated with greater creator involvement, as well as with more and 
longer replies to backers. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to prior 
research on the role of disclosure in capital markets. We answer the recent call in Leuz and 
Wysocki (2016) and Leuz (2018) for more evidence on the role of disclosure in alternative, 
and often unregulated, financing venues. We show that, even in the absence of clear 
regulation and enforcement mechanisms, disclosure can mitigate moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems, thereby facilitating contracting between creators and backers. Second, by 
showing that consumer protection regulation affects the perceived credibility of disclosure, 
we contribute to the law and economics literature that examines the role of regulation and 
enforcement in addressing moral hazard and adverse selection (e.g., Mahoney, 2009). We are 
among the first to empirically examine the effect of consumer protection regulation on 
disclosure credibility. Third, we contribute to the nascent literature on the role of disclosure 
in peer-to-peer lending (Michels, 2012), reward crowdfunding (e.g., Mollick, 2014, 2015, 
2016; Courtney et al., 2017), and crypto-tokens markets (e.g., Bourveau et al., 2019), by 






2. Institutional Background 
2.1. Reward Crowdfunding 
Reward crowdfunding is a form of financing whereby (a large number of small) 
backers provide funds to creators in exchange for rewards (often in the form of products that 
creators intend to develop). Reward crowdfunding transactions often consist of “pre-sales,” in 
which backers play a “double role” as consumers and investors (Belleflamme et al. (2015) 
label these hybrid stakeholders “prosumers”). As such, reward crowdfunding allows an 
entrepreneur to contract with future consumers and obtain valuable information about the 
demand for a product before the investment is sunk (Chemla and Tinn, 2018; Strausz, 2017). 
In addition to reducing demand uncertainty, reward crowdfunding serves the purpose of 
providing creators with inputs on their products and ideas for modifications and extensions, 
which ultimately promote user-driven innovation (Agrawal et al., 2014; Belleflamme et al., 
2015). Finally, reward crowdfunding plays a role in talent discovery by allowing creators to 
signal their ability (Gutiérrez and Sáez, 2018).  
The aforementioned advantages come at a cost, however. First, while other sources of 
funding may allow entrepreneurs to keep their business ideas secret from competitors, in 
reward crowdfunding they must pitch their products on a public platform. This may have 
repercussions on patentability (i.e., their ideas may be copied) and limit their bargaining 
power with potential suppliers (Agrawal et al., 2014). Moreover, because individual pledges 
are typically small, and projects involve a large number of backers, managing communication 
with backers may be costly, especially when the delivery of rewards is delayed. When reward 
crowdfunding is used as an alternative to other sources of financing, such as angel capital and 
venture capital, the entrepreneur may miss out on the value created by these players’ industry 




combination, with venture capitalists sometimes requiring entrepreneurs to launch a 
campaign on a reward crowdfunding platform to reduce demand uncertainty before investing.  
Backers pledge funds to reward crowdfunding campaigns for several reasons (Gerber et 
al., 2012). These include philanthropy, engaging and contributing to a trusting and creative 
community, and supporting others and their causes, but also, importantly, the project rewards 
themselves, often in the form of early access to new products.  
Reward crowdfunding platforms typically receive a transaction fee for successful 
projects (in the case of Kickstarter this transaction fee is 5% of the total funding amount). 
Therefore, their objective is to maximize the number of successful projects and the amount 
pledged to these projects. This implies creating a large community of users, attracting high-
quality projects, and facilitating the matching between creators and backers (Agrawal et al., 
2014). 
An emerging literature in entrepreneurship has started to examine the determinants of 
successful project funding (e.g., Mollick, 2014; Barbi and Bigelli, 2017; Courtney et al., 
2017; Lin and Pursiainen, 2018). Collectively, these studies highlight the importance of 
several factors, such as the social capital of creators (e.g., number of friends on Facebook, 
support for other projects on Kickstarter), the duration of the funding period, the number of 
rewards, and whether a given project is featured on Kickstarter as “project of the day.”7  
However, evidence on whether creator disclosures help backers assess project quality 
on reward crowdfunding platforms is surprisingly scant. The role of disclosure in these 
markets is particularly interesting because information asymmetries between creators and 
backers are pervasive and often create adverse selection and moral hazard issues. Project 
quality and creator ability are typically not observable by backers. Backers are also unable to 
induce creator effort and, in extreme cases, there is a risk that creators may use funds for their 
                                                            
7 This literature further documents that a large number of successfully-funded projects have developed into 
business ventures generating additional investments and revenues outside Kickstarter and increasing 




personal consumption, which would constitute outright fraud. Adverse selection plays a 
secondary role in the sense that misrepresenting project information is, in general, only 
profitable for a creator in the presence of moral hazard (Strausz, 2017). 
Prior studies have examined investor reactions to voluntary disclosures in other 
unregulated markets and found that investors respond to these disclosures. Sivakumar and 
Waymire (1994) study voluntary disclosures made by NYSE firms from 1905 to 1910, when 
there were minimal reporting requirements and no accounting standards. Michels (2012) 
examines voluntary disclosures made by borrowers on the Prosper.com peer-to-peer lending 
platform. More recently, Bourveau et al. (2019) investigate the role of disclosure and 
information intermediaries in crypto-tokens markets. While one may argue that reward 
crowdfunding shares features that are similar to those of unregulated equity markets, peer-to-
peer lending platforms, and crypto-tokens markets, the one-shot nature of the contractual 
relationship between creators and backers (i.e., single-period game), as well as the different 
nature of payoffs, the absence of a secondary market, and the hybrid nature of project backers 
(in between consumers and investors), may limit the extent to which other studies’ findings 
generalize to reward crowdfunding. Therefore, whether creator disclosures facilitate 
contracting between backers and creators is an open empirical question. 
 
2.2. Consumer Protection Regulation and Reward Crowdfunding 
The main objective of regulation in securities markets is to guarantee market integrity 
and to ensure investor protection (e.g., Goshen and Parchomovsky 2006; Mahoney 2009; 
Christensen et al., 2017). Market regulators often impose stringent disclosure requirements on 
security issuers to meet this objective. Costly disclosure requirements, however, may impose 
an excessive burden on small firms, which are usually the most innovative and high-growth 
ventures. Therefore, market regulators are confronted with a choice between: (i) a lightly-




disclosure burdens; and (ii) a heavily-regulated market, in which small high-growth firms 
may be discouraged by disproportionate compliance requirements (Brüggemann et al., 2017). 
The above reasoning is particularly pertinent to the case of reward crowdfunding 
platforms. On the one hand, the competitive advantage of these alternative markets is to 
provide a venue for venture financing with very limited (if any) regulations, which should 
allow creators to focus on innovative (high-risk) projects with a view to ultimately spur 
innovation. On the other hand, the regulatory uncertainty and minimal standards for 
disclosure verifiability typically plague these platforms with moral hazard problems because 
of information asymmetries which may ultimately lead to market failure (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; 
Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). 
Reward crowdfunding platforms, such as Kickstarter, are not subject to any bespoke 
regulation. Furthermore, as reward crowdfunding does not involve securities, it does not fall 
under the U.S. securities laws or the jurisdiction of the SEC. As in the case of other evolving 
technologies, which often lead to a game of catch-up by regulators and enforcement agencies, 
the development of reward crowdfunding has initially led to a regulatory limbo.  
The change in Kickstarter’s terms of use in September 2014, however, clarified the 
nature of the contract between backers and creators and set out the terms that govern that 
contract.8 The new terms of use now specifically state that: “When a project is successfully 
funded, the creator must complete the project and fulfill each reward” and, if unable to do so, 
must remedy the situation by demonstrating that “they have used funds appropriately and 
made every reasonable effort to complete the project as promised” and that they “have made 
                                                            
8 When Kickstarter announced the change in terms of use on its blog, it indicated that the goal of the change was 
“to make sure every part of the Kickstarter system is clear and straightforward.” The change may have also 
been prompted by other potential factors such as: (i) the negative coverage received by a set of highly-
publicized projects that eventually failed; and (ii) Kickstarter’s desire to clarify that the platform bears no legal 
responsibility for funded projects that do not deliver the promised rewards. We discuss these and other potential 




no material misrepresentations in their communication to backers.”9 Kickstarter clearly 
spells out the possibility of legal recourse, and the associated legal liability for creators: “The 
creator is solely responsible for fulfilling the promises made in their project. If they’re unable 
to satisfy the terms of this agreement [i.e., deliver rewards or return backer contributions], 
they may be subject to legal action.” Prior to this change, the terms of use did not mention the 
possibility of legal action by backers at all.10 The change in terms of use was highly 
publicized by Kickstarter, drew the attention of both the mainstream and tech-dedicated 
media, and was widely discussed on social media. These discussions emphasized the 
heightened litigation risk and were later followed by a number of landmark lawsuits (see 
Appendix A).11 
The main mechanism through which legal action may take place is consumer protection 
regulation aimed at protecting consumers from “unfair and deceptive trade practices.” The 
introduction of Kickstarter’s new terms of use is important because it made users aware that 
consumer protection laws could apply to reward crowdfunding. Prior to the rule change, 
Kickstarter had instead emphasized that backers (creators) were not consumers (merchants) 
purchasing (selling) goods. We discuss the applicability of consumer protection laws to 
reward crowdfunding in more detail in Appendix A.  
Consumer protection regulation is enforced at the federal level by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC). In addition, U.S. states have their own consumer fraud statutes, the 
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices (UDAP) statutes, which vary significantly in 
                                                            
9 See https://www.kickstarter.com/terms-of-use. 
10 See https://www.kickstarter.com/terms-of-use/oct2012?country=US. 
11 For example, on September 19, 2014 TechCrunch published an article highlighting Kickstarter’s revised 
terms of use in which it stated: “Kickstarter also reminds creators that they need to be “honest” and not make 
“material misrepresentations in their communication to backers.” (In other words, scammers beware.) 
Additionally, the terms now state that creators who are unable to stand by the promises they made in their 
project may be subject to legal action by backers.” Similarly, on September 22, 2014 NBC News reported: 
“Kickstarter is trying to codify the current swampy situation around projects canceled after creators have the 
cash in hand. (…) If creators don’t make good on the promises made in their campaigns, they must explain what 
happened, return any unused funds, and could face potential legal action from backers.” See Section 1 of the 




strength and are enforced by state agencies (usually the State Attorney General). Public 
enforcement agencies (at the federal and state level) have limited resources and, therefore, 
cannot pursue all cases. Private litigation is another avenue of legal recourse available to 
backers in some states. In this respect, class actions may play an important role as projects 
often involve many backers, each pledging a small amount.12  
The strength of consumer protection laws (UDAP statues) varies extensively from state 
to state along several dimensions, namely, their substantive prohibitions, their scope, the 
remedies they provide for the state enforcement agency, and the remedies they provide for 
consumers (see Appendix A). The National Consumer Law Center’s report on UDAP 
provides information on state consumer protection laws along these four broad dimensions. 
Based on this information, we construct an index that captures the strength of state-level 
consumer protection regulation (see Appendix A, Table A-2). Figure 1 illustrates the 
differential strengths of consumer protection regulation across U.S. states. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To examine the interplay of disclosure and regulation in reward crowdfunding, we 
scrape information from Kickstarter using R scripts.13 Table 1, Panel A, provides the details 
of our sample selection procedure. We identify 332,364 projects launched between April 28, 
2009 (i.e., the date of Kickstarter’s official launch) and July 15, 2017. These projects 
represent 92% of the 361,804 projects that were launched during that period according to 
Kickstarter.14 To the best of our knowledge, our sample of Kickstarter projects is more 
                                                            
12 For example, the backers of Onagofly filed in 2017 a class action lawsuit against its creator for breach of 
contract, alleging “uniform and consistent misrepresentations to all its customers” (Alan Black et al. vs. 
Shenzen Sunshine Technology Development Ltd). 
13 Figure OA-1 in the Online Appendix provides an example of a Kickstarter project webpage. 
14 We obtain the total number of projects launched during that period from 
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats using the Wayback Machine (available at: http://archive.org/web/) to 
revert to the saved snapshot of the website that is closer to July 15, 2017 (i.e., July 13, 2017). The reason why 
our coverage is not 100% is that there is a limit to the number of projects shown by Kickstarter in each search. 




comprehensive in coverage than those of prior studies (cf. 86% coverage in Lin and 
Pursiainen (2018)). We obtain information on the project funding period from the campaign 
and updates tabs, and the project location from the campaign tab. We delete projects for 
which we are unable to determine funding period and location country (417 and 1,722 
projects, respectively). We drop 75,131 foreign projects thus restricting our sample to U.S. 
projects only. We further limit our sample to projects with funding goals greater than zero for 
which we are able to identify the project state. Project location must be consistent with the 
address, bank account, government-issued ID, and major debit or credit card details provided 
by creators. Our final sample consists of 255,017 projects, 80% of which launched in years 
2012 to 2016 (Table 1, Panel B).  
57% of the projects are in the “Film and Video,” “Music,” “Publishing,” and “Games” 
categories (Table 1, Panel C). “Art” and “Technology” are also sizeable categories, each 
representing approximately 7% of our sample. Projects often involve modest amounts: 43% 
of the sample projects have funding goals below U.S. $5,000, and only 27% have funding 
goals above U.S. $15,000 (Table 1, Panel D). Nonetheless, several projects have raised more 
than U.S. $10 million. These include the Pebble E-Paper watch, Pebble Time and Pebble 
Time 2 in 2012, 2015, and 2016, respectively, the Coolest Cooler in 2014, and the Kingdom 
Death: Monster 1.5 tabletop game in 2017.  
Table 1, Panel E, presents descriptive statistics for the projects in our sample.15 The 
average (median) funding goal is U.S. $18,124 (U.S. $5,000). The amount pledged is on 
average lower (U.S. $6,597) reflecting the fact that only 39% of the projects are successful. 
Figures OA-2, OA-3, and OA-4 in the Online Appendix graphically illustrate the extent of 
variation in total number of projects, average number of successful projects, and total amount 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
sample is the most comprehensive, we combine the links retrieved from this search with a set of links made 
publicly available by Web Robots at http://webrobots.io/kickstarter-datasets/.  
15 All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile of their distributions. All variables are 




pledged across U.S. states. While the number of projects and the total amount pledged are, to 
a large extent, geographically concentrated (e.g., in California and New York), the number of 
successful projects appears to be more evenly distributed across states. The average (median) 
number of backers is 79 (15). The majority of backers have previously supported other 
projects on Kickstarter (a project attracts on average 50 returning backers). Backers often 
interact with project creators and other backers via the comments tab. They ask questions 
about the product and make suggestions for product development. Engagement in this forum 
may be regarded as a sign of project success, especially from backers who regularly support a 
large number of projects (i.e., superbackers).16 The average number of words written by 
backers (superbackers) in the comments tab is 107 (22).  
Project creators must prepare a campaign pitch, in which they describe and promote the 
project, often providing details of the project’s history and milestones achieved thus far, as 
well as the timeline for completion. In addition, projects include a risks and challenges 
section.17 The average lengths of the campaign pitch and risk and challenges section are 585 
and 127 words, respectively. Creators also typically provide their biography (103 words on 
average), including a link to their Facebook page. Creators have 543 friends on Facebook on 
average, sometimes work in teams (4% of the projects in our sample), and often back other 
projects on Kickstarter (on average 6 projects). Finally, project creators must define the 
funding period (funding periods can last from 1 to 60 days and are on average approximately 
one month), as well as the range (and pricing) of rewards on offer (on average projects have 8 






16 Superbackers are backers that have supported more than 25 projects with pledges of at least U.S. $10 in the 
previous year. 
17 Since this section was introduced in 2012, we are able to collect information on risks and challenges for 




4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Identification Strategy  
To examine how the interplay of disclosure and regulation affects the likelihood of 
project success, we take advantage of the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use announced on 
September 19, 2014.18 The rule change essentially strengthened the contractual position of 
backers by explicitly requiring creators to fulfill their obligation to deliver the promised 
rewards and spelling out the possibility of legal action.  
We expect that, following the rule change, the perceived credibility of project 
disclosure (i.e., the sensitivity of project success to disclosure) increases in the stringency of 
state consumer protection regulations. To gauge the effect of the change in terms of use on 
disclosure credibility, we employ a research design in the spirit of a generalized DiD, which 
allows us to exploit cross-state variation in consumer protection regulation. Our identification 
strategy effectively compares disclosure credibility before and after the rule change by 
looking at differential responses across states, depending on the varying degrees of stringency 
in their pre-existing consumer protection laws.19 A maintained assumption underlying our 
design is that, prior to the rule change, there was limited awareness that state consumer 
protection laws would apply to Kickstarter creators and backers, despite state consumer 
protection laws being already in place (an assumption that is supported by a number of 
                                                            
18 While the updated terms of use went into effect on October 19, 2014 (see https://www.kickstarter.com/terms-
of-use), we conduct our analysis using the announcement date (i.e., September 19, 2014) as the change in terms 
of use had been already covered in depth by both mainstream and specialized media outlets on that date (Lin and 
Pursiainen, 2018). Nevertheless, in sensitivity tests (untabulated) we perform our main analyses using the entry-
into-force date and find that the results are similar to those reported and none of our inferences change. 
19 To draw a parallel with medical research, our DiD design differs from a randomized controlled trial with 
dichotomous treatment that compares a single treated group that receives the drug with a single control group 
that receives the placebo, and is instead more similar to a randomized controlled trial in which the comparison 




studies in law (e.g., Ganatra (2016))), and that the rule change increased the awareness of 
creators and backers regarding the possibility of legal action.20  
To provide support for this assumption, we take a four-pronged approach, which we 
describe in more detail in Section 1 of the Online Appendix. First, we explore how 
Kickstarter publicized the introduction of its new terms of use and find that the rule change 
was announced on Kickstarter’s website, social media, and via email to all registered users. 
Second, we conduct an in-depth analysis of the (mainstream and tech-dedicated) media 
coverage of the rule change and provide supporting evidence for extensive discussions on 
how the new terms of use would alleviate moral hazard problems by introducing the 
possibility of legal actions by backers. Third, we investigate how Kickstarter’s rule change 
was discussed in social media by analyzing a sample of “tweets” surrounding the 
announcement. The general tenor of these tweets provides interesting anecdotal confirmation 
that potential backers and creators indeed changed their perceptions of legal liability. Fourth, 
we supplement this anecdotal evidence with additional empirical tests. We put forward a 
request to the FTC under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for a list of all consumer 
complaints involving the Kickstarter platform. We find that the number of consumer 
complaints increases following the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use, especially in states 
with stronger consumer protection, consistent with the role of consumer protection becoming 
more salient to backers in those states. Moreover, we conduct a textual analysis of backer 
comments and find that, after the change in terms of use, backer sentiment increases and 
delayed reward deliveries as well as fraudulent projects decrease, consistent with heightened 
perceptions of legal liability by creators. 
Taken together, both the anecdotal evidence provided and the results of the empirical 
tests that we conduct offer strong support for our maintained assumption that (potential) 
                                                            
20 Ganatra (2016) argues that, because prior to the change in terms of use Kickstarter stated that backers were 
not consumers and creators were not merchants, it was unclear whether consumer protection laws would apply 




backers and creators were indeed aware of the change in terms of use and that this change 
was followed by increased awareness of legal liability (by creators) and legal protection (by 
backers).21 
To examine the effect of the change in terms of use on disclosure credibility, we 
estimate various model specifications of the following form: 
. 
(1)
The dependent variable ( ) is either an indicator capturing whether the amount pledged by 
backers reaches the project’s funding goal ( ), or the natural logarithm of the amount 
pledged to a project ( ).	 ⋅  indicates the model functional form (i.e., Logit or 
OLS).	  denotes one of the different project disclosure proxies (i.e., the length of 
the campaign pitch ( 	 ) and the length of the risks and challenges section 
( 	 	 ) measured in number of words).  captures the strength 
of consumer protection laws in the respective state.	  is an indicator variable taking the 
value of one after September 19, 2014.	  is a vector of project, creator, and macro-
level control variables, which we include to account for time-varying factors affecting the 
response variable of interest. 	  represents state and project subcategory×year-
month (or state, project subcategory, and year-month) fixed effects.22 Detailed variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix B. 
The inclusion of state fixed effects allows us to control for time-invariant state-level 
factors potentially affecting the likelihood of project success. Project subcategory×year-
                                                            
21 This is also evidenced by comments on delayed projects, where backers often quote Kickstarter’s terms of use 
and sometimes threaten creators with litigation. For example on March 23, 2018 a backer of  Eye-Smart 
Android Case for iPhone writes “I invoke my rights under Kickstarter’s Terms of Use […] Project Creators are 
required to fulfill all rewards of their successful fundraising campaigns or refund any Backer whose reward 
they do not or cannot fulfill […] I demand a full refund for my pledge amount ASAP.” 
22 The main effects of  and  are not included in equation (1) because they are perfectly collinear 
with state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects, respectively. We rely on Kickstarter’s project subcategory 
classification. Kickstarter classifies projects into 51 subcategories, which represent finer partitions of the project 




month fixed effects account for unobservable heterogeneity in time-varying project sub-
category characteristics that are likely to explain variation in both project success and 
disclosure. We draw statistical inferences based on standard errors clustered at the project 
state and year-month level.23 Our main coefficient of interest in equation (1) is . If, as we 
predict, the perceived credibility of project disclosure increases when state-level consumer 
protection laws are stricter following the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use, then  should 
be positive.  
Unobservable state time-varying factors may potentially present a challenge to our 
identification strategy. These factors could bias our inferences if correlated with the treatment 
(i.e., with the timing of the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use and with the strength of state-
level consumer protection laws). We employ several strategies to alleviate this potential 
concern (see Section 4.4). 
A further challenge may come from changes in unobservable project characteristics 
around the introduction of the new terms of use. To bias our treatment effect however, these 
changes would have to systematically vary with the stringency of consumer protection laws 
across states and correlate with both project funding and disclosure. To mitigate this concern, 
we nonetheless control for project subcategory×year-month fixed effects, as well as for a host 
of project-specific characteristics. Moreover, our analysis of disclosure attributes discussed in 
Section 4.8 further allays the potential concern that the documented increase in the 
association between disclosure and project success might simply reflect an improvement in 







23 We cluster standard errors at the project state and year-month level because our treatment varies across states 




4.2. Descriptive Evidence on the Association between Project Success and Disclosure  
To provide initial descriptive evidence of the role of disclosure on Kickstarter, we 
examine the association between disclosure and project success. Whether creator disclosures 
facilitate contracting between backers and creators is ex ante unclear. On the one hand, 
project rewards are one of the main reasons backers participate in reward crowdfunding 
(Gerber, 2012) and, therefore, backers should factor in their decision to pledge any 
information that is relevant to estimate the probability that rewards will be delivered. On the 
other hand, disclosures in this market may not be credible because: (i) disclosures are, to a 
large extent, voluntary and unverifiable; (ii) most backers only access the platform once; and 
(iii) there is substantial regulatory uncertainty. However, certain features of reward 
crowdfunding may render disclosures credible even in the absence of regulation. To the 
extent that Kickstarter creators are interested in assessing demand for their products and 
increasing subsequent sales, they have an incentive to disclose truthfully. This, in turn, 
alleviates moral hazard and prevents market failure (e.g., Strausz, 2017; Gutiérrez and Sáez, 
2018).  
Table 2 presents the results of the tests that examine the association between disclosure 
and project success. We focus on two disclosure proxies: the length of the campaign pitch 
( 	 ) and the length of the risks and challenges section 
( 	 	 ). We also consider two main measures of project success: an 
indicator variable equal to one if a project’s funding goal is reached ( ) and the 
natural logarithm of the amount pledged to a project ( ). 
We control for several project characteristics, such as a project’s funding goal 
( ), the duration of the funding period ( ), whether a project is chosen 
by Kickstarter as a “project of the day” ( 	 	 	 , whether a project has 




( ).24 We also control for creator characteristics, such as the length of a creator 
biography ( 	 ), the number of Kickstarter projects backed by a creator 
( 	 ), and the number of friends a creator has on Facebook 
( 	 ). Finally, we control for an extensive set of time-varying macro 
factors, including state per capita GDP ( ), whether a project is in a high-trust region 
( ), regional internet access ( 	 ), extent of credit constraints 
( 	 ), and Kickstarter funding performance in the previous year 
( 	 ).  
Panel A presents the results of the analysis where the dependent variable is . 
Columns (1), (3), and (5) display coefficient estimates (and respective z-statistics) of logistic 
regressions including subcategory, state, and year-month fixed effects. The remaining 
columns display the results from the estimation of linear probability models in which we 
replace subcategory and year-month fixed effects with subcategory×year-month fixed effects 
(Columns (2), (4), and (6)) to account for unobservable time-varying subcategory factors. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Qiu, 2013; Barbi and Bigelli, 2017), projects with 
shorter funding periods, lower funding goals, multiple creators, multiple rewards, and 
projects that are selected by Kickstarter as “project of the day” are more likely to be 
successful.25 Longer creator biographies and creator social capital (proxied by the number of 
Facebook friends and the number of projects previously backed by a creator) are also 
associated with higher likelihood of success, in line with Lin et al. (2013), Mollick (2014), 
Kim et al. (2015), and Koch and Siering (2015). As expected, state per capita GDP, trust, 
internet access, and lagged Kickstarter funding performance exhibit positive associations 
                                                            
24 In additional sensitivity analyses (untabulated), we re-run our main tests also controlling for the number of 
videos and images on projects’ webpages and continue to find a significant association between disclosure and 
project success.  
25 The positive coefficient on 	  is also consistent with a widespread consensus that the 
performance of new ventures is higher when these are launched by teams as opposed to individuals, a consensus 




with the likelihood of success in most specifications. The association between bank 
concentration (our proxy for credit constraints) and the likelihood of success is also positive, 
although generally not significant.26 The different model specifications consistently show a 
positive association between the likelihood of a project being funded and our disclosure 
proxies ( 	  and 	 	 ). The economic magnitude 
of the association is similar across specifications. As the length of the campaign pitch (risks 
and challenges section) increases by one standard deviation, the probability of success 
increases by 1.8 (0.8) percentage points (based on the coefficients reported in Column (6)).27  
In Panel B, the dependent variable is instead . We find that, across all 
specifications, amount pledged is robustly associated with disclosure. Specifically, as the 
campaign pitch (risks and challenges section) increases by one standard deviation, the 
amount of funds pledged to a project increases by U.S. $521 (U.S. $80) or, equivalently, by 
29.0% (4.5%) (based on the coefficients reported in Column (3)).28 The documented 
association between disclosure and funding is consistently positive and significant across 









26 The expected sign of the coefficient on this variable is ex-ante unclear. To the extent that bank credit and 
crowdfunding are substitutes and entrepreneurs rely on Kickstarter (at least in part) to assess demand for their 
projects, more expensive bank credit may be associated with a composition of projects on Kickstarter that is 
tilted towards safer projects. It is possible, however, that restrictions to bank credit are also associated with 
lower availability of funds to backers and hence lower project funding. 
27 To estimate the effect of a standard deviation change in the campaign pitch on the probability of success, we 
multiply the coefficient on 	  by the difference between the logarithm of the average length 
of the campaign pitch and the logarithm of the average increased by the standard deviation. 
28 To estimate the effect of a standard deviation change in the campaign pitch on the amount of funds pledged to 
the project, we first set all control variables to their sample means and take the logarithm when applicable. We 
then compute the corresponding fitted value of . Next, we increase 	  by its 
standard deviation, and calculate a new fitted value of , leaving the other variables unchanged at 
their means. The dollar effect of a standard deviation change in the campaign pitch is equal to the difference in 
the exponentials of the two fitted values. To restate this effect in percentage terms, we divide it by the fitted 




4.3. Consumer Protection and Disclosure Credibility 
In this section, we employ the research design in the spirit of a DiD described in 
Section 4.1 to assess whether, subsequent to the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use, the 
perceived credibility of disclosure increases in states with stronger consumer protection laws.  
An important identifying assumption in a DiD research design is that, in the absence of 
treatment, treatment and control groups would exhibit similar trends in the outcome variable 
of interest (i.e., parallel trends). Because counterfactual trends are not empirically observable, 
we assess the validity of the parallel-trends assumption by testing for differences in pre-
treatment trends. We examine differences in disclosure credibility trends across states with 
varying degrees of consumer protection by mapping out counterfactual treatment effects over 
our sample period. We map out these effects by replacing  and its two- and three-way 
interactions with  and  with four separate time indicators and their 
respective two- and three-way interactions with  and  in our main model 
specification. Our treatment effects are captured by the three-way interactions of each of the 
four separate time indicators with  and . We plot the estimated treatment 
effects in Figure 2. The evidence in Figure 2 suggests that, while prior to the rule change the 
estimated treatment effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero, they experience a 
sharp increase in the months following the rule change that persists over time. This is the case 
irrespective of the success and disclosure proxies we use. 
Table 3 presents the results from the estimation of equation (1). The dependent variable 
in Panel A is . We find that, following the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use, the 
association between the likelihood of success and our two measures of disclosure increases, 
which we interpret as an improvement in the perceived credibility of disclosure. Note that, 
while the association between the outcome of a funding campaign and disclosure increases 




indicates that disclosure was already perceived as credible when the market was largely 
unregulated. Consistent with our expectations, the increase in the perceived credibility of 
disclosure is more pronounced in states with stronger consumer protection. This finding is 
robust to different model specifications and fixed effects structures.  
Following the rule change, an increase in the length of the campaign pitch by one 
standard deviation increases the probability of success by an additional 3.8 (0.3) percentage 
points in states where  is equal to 16 (1). The negative and significant coefficient on  
  is also noteworthy. It suggests that, as the risk of litigation increases, 
projects with relatively lower levels of disclosure experience a decrease in funding. 
Specifically, in states where  is equal to 1, funding decreases for projects with a 
campaign pitch of less than 99.48 words. In states where  is equal to 16, this 
decrease in funding is observed for projects with a campaign pitch of less than 287.59 
words.29  
In Panel B, the dependent variable is . Our coefficient of interest, 
, is again positive and significant for our two disclosure 
measures, indicating that the elasticity of the amount pledged to the number of words in the 
campaign pitch and risks and challenges section increases in states with stronger consumer 
protection following the rule change. This increase ranges from 0.025 (in states where 
 is equal to 1) to 0.400 (in states where  is equal to 16) for the campaign 
pitch (Column (1)) and from 0.023 (in states where  is equal to 1) to 0.368 (in states 
where  is equal to 16) for the risks and challenges section (Column (2)). Thus, in 
states with stricter consumer protection laws, the elasticity of amount pledged to disclosure 
                                                            
29 These estimates are based on the calculation of break-even points. These represent the levels of disclosure that 
leave the probability of success unchanged following the introduction of the new terms of use. For example, 
when  is equal to 16, the break-even point is calculated by solving the following equation: 16
16 0, where  are the estimated coefficients reported in Table 3, 




doubles following the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use, again indicating that the increase 
in the perceived credibility of disclosure is economically meaningful. To further gauge the 
economic significance of our results, we recast them in U.S. dollars. Following the rule 
change, an increase in the length of the campaign pitch by one standard deviation increases 
the amount pledged by an additional U.S. $730 (U.S. $119) in states where  is equal 
to 16 (1). Similarly, an increase in the length of the risks and challenges section by one 
standard deviation increases the amount pledged by an additional U.S. $497 (U.S. $67) in 
states where  is equal to 16 (1).30 
 
4.4. Mitigating the Influence of State-Level Time-Varying Factors 
An identification challenge to our research design comes from local shocks at the state 
level, which may constitute a potential source of omitted variable bias if correlated both with 
the treatment and the disclosure-funding status relation.  
Controlling for time-varying factors potentially affecting the disclosure-funding status 
relation and Kickstarter’s decision to change its terms of use (see Section 2 of the Online 
Appendix) is especially important because our treatment is concentrated in time. For this 
reason, in our model specifications, we control for a host of macro factors, such as state per 
capita GDP, trust, internet access, credit constraints, and Kickstarter funding performance in 
the previous year. Nevertheless, to further allay the concern that unobservable state-level 
time-varying factors may confound our results, we conduct a series of additional tests. 
First, we limit the sample to shorter time windows of one and two years before and 
after the rule change. The use of a shorter window mitigates the concern that the effect that 
we document may be due to other changes taking place during the sample period. Moreover, 
using a shorter window around the rule change also alleviates the concern that overall 
                                                            
30 Section 4 of the Online Appendix discusses a set of robustness tests that allay potential concerns regarding the 




changes in market structure (e.g., changes in the type of projects on Kickstarter following the 
rule change) may be driving our results. As shown in Table 4, Panel A, our coefficient of 
interest remains positive and significant across all specifications in these shorter windows, 
with the exception of the regression of probability of success on the length of the risks and 
challenges section in Column (3), where the coefficient is positive but not significant.  
Second, we conduct a county-level analysis (Card and Krueger, 1997; Holmes, 2006; 
and Dube et al., 2010) in which we restrict the sample to contiguous counties of different 
states. Assuming that local economic conditions are plausibly similar along a state border, 
our county-level analysis allows us to exploit discontinuities in the strength of consumer 
protection across state borders, while effectively controlling for local economic conditions. 
Figure 3 illustrates the contiguous counties located at U.S. state-border segments and Table 4, 
Panel B, presents the results of this analysis. Odd-numbered columns include subcategory, 
county, and year-month fixed effects. Even-numbered columns replace year-month fixed 
effects by border×year-month fixed effects. Our main coefficient of interest, 
, remains positive and significant across the different specifications and 
across the different success and disclosure variables. Furthermore, the magnitude of this 
coefficient is similar to the coefficient magnitudes reported in previous tables.  
Third, we also conduct an additional set of tests in which we impose more stringent 
fixed effects structures (e.g., state×year-month fixed effects) effectively subsuming 
observable and unobservable state-level time-varying factors potentially affecting the 
disclosure-funding status relation. The results of these tests, presented in Table 4, Panel C, 
confirm the inferences we draw from our main analysis.31  
Finally, we follow the approach described in Oster (2019) to assess the stability of our 
treatment effects and evaluate their robustness to omitted variable bias. The evidence from 
                                                            
31 In this set of tests (Table 4, Panel C), the interaction term  as well as the macro-level control 




this analysis, discussed in Section 5 of the Online Appendix, suggests that it is unlikely that 
our treatment effects are driven by omitted variables. 
 
4.5. Disclosure and Project Backers 
In this section, we examine the effect of the rule change on the number of project 
backers and their level of engagement. Table 5 presents the results of these analyses. In Panel 
A, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of backers ( ). 
We document a positive and significant association between disclosure and the number of 
backers before the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use. This association increases following 
the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use in states with stricter consumer protection laws, as 
indicated by the positive coefficient on .32  
In Panel B, we separately examine the effects of the change in regulation on the number 
of new and returning backers. We find that, following the change in Kickstarter’s terms of 
use, the elasticity of the number of both types of backers to disclosure increases, suggesting 
that disclosure plays an increasingly important role not only in retaining existing Kickstarter 
users, but also in attracting new backers to the platform. 
In Panel C, we examine the effect of the rule change on the level of backer engagement, 
namely on the extent to which backers comment on a project’s page. Backer comments are a 
form of third-party endorsement (Courtney et al., 2017) and often provide valuable feedback 
to creators, enabling the development of a virtual community and of a social buzz around the 
project (Belleflamme et al., 2015). Therefore, a large number of backers supporting and 
engaging with a particular project campaign can be regarded as a signal of project success. 
We consider backers that frequently invest on the platform (i.e., superbackers) separately. 
                                                            
32 The increase in the elasticity of the number of backers to the length of the campaign pitch (risks and 
challenges section) ranges from 0.015 (0.012) in states where   is equal to 1 to 0.240 (0.192) in states 
where  is equal to 16. Following the rule change, an increase in the length of the campaign pitch by one 
standard deviation increases the number of backers by an additional 1 (8) backer(s) in states where  is 





Superbackers are perceived as the most experienced and sophisticated funders. They may 
thus play a role similar to that of institutional investors in traditional equity and credit 
markets; pledges made by superbackers and their active engagement may be regarded by 
other backers as a signal of project quality (Xu, 2018). Both of our disclosure measures 
exhibit a significantly positive association with backer and superbacker engagement. 
Following the change in Kickstarter regulation, this association increases in states with 
stronger consumer protection, consistent with an increase in the perceived credibility of 
disclosure in these states. 
 
4.6. Heterogeneity in Treatment Effects 
In this section, we examine cross-sectional variation in treatment effects. We argue that 
the effect of state consumer protection laws on perceived disclosure credibility is likely to 
vary depending on: (i) the size of the claim (i.e., the magnitude of the rewards); and (ii) the 
efficiency of the courts that enforce those laws (see Iverson (2017) who examines bankruptcy 
outcomes). This is because it may not be cost-effective for backers to litigate small claims as 
the potential awards would be insufficient to cover legal fees. While small claimants may be 
able to seek redress through a class action (which allows a representative plaintiff to bring a 
lawsuit on behalf of a large number of claimants, effectively aggregating multiple claims), we 
expect the perceived increase in litigation risk to be more pronounced for projects involving 
larger rewards. Furthermore, the perceived increase in litigation risk (by creators and backers 
alike) arguably depends on factors such as the extent of confidence in courts and the degree 
of court busyness. Specifically, we expect the effect of the rule change on disclosure 
credibility to be stronger in states whose courts are believed to handle criminal offences in a 
fairer way. Similarly, we expect the effect to be more pronounced in states whose courts 




In Table 6, Panel A, we partition projects based on median reward magnitude. The 
coefficient on  is positive and significant across all groups as 
expected (note that small backers may also file suit through a class action) but significantly 
higher in the subsample of projects with larger rewards. 
In Table 6, Panels B and C, we partition projects based on the extent of confidence in 
courts and the degree of court busyness. We measure confidence in courts based on the 
General Social Survey. Specifically, we compute the percentage of survey respondents in a 
project’s region that believe that courts in their own region deal with criminals in a fair 
way.33 A region is classified as having low (high) confidence in courts if this percentage is 
lower (higher) than the median across U.S. regions. We find that the effect of the rule change 
is significantly lower when confidence in courts is low across all success and disclosure 
measures, with the exception of the regression of   on 	  
where the coefficients on  are not significantly different 
across the low and high confidence partitions (Table 6, Panel B). We measure court busyness 
based on the total caseload per capita of state courts before the change in terms in use. We 
classify a state court as having low (high) caseload if the respective caseload is below (above) 
the median across all U.S. states. In Table 6, Panel C, we split the sample based on court 
caseload. We expect the coefficient on  to be positive and 
significant across all groups but significantly lower when the respective state court caseload 
is high. While the relative magnitudes of coefficients across the different partitions are in line 
with our expectations across all specifications, their difference is only significant in the 
regression of  on 	 . 
Combined, the evidence from our cross-sectional tests allays the potential concern that 
the increase in disclosure credibility that we document in states with stricter consumer 
                                                            
33 Data for these tests are available at the aggregate level for nine U.S. regions (i.e., New England, Mid-Atlantic, 




protection after the introduction of Kickstarter’s new terms of use is attributable to factors 
other than the perceived increase in consumer litigation risk. 
 
4.7. Do Project Backers Increasingly Fall for Cheap Talk After the Rule Change? 
In our main analysis, we show that the introduction of Kickstarter’s new terms of use 
strengthens the association between disclosure and project funding, which we argue is 
consistent with an improvement in disclosure credibility. However, a potential alternative 
explanation for this stronger association could be that, after the rule change, project bakers 
increasingly fall for uninformative or deceitful disclosure.  
To alleviate this cheap talk concern, we test whether, after the rule change, the 
association between disclosure and project quality becomes stronger. We contend that 
Kickstarter’s new terms of use increase litigation risk and, consequently, the cost creators 
potentially face in case of misreporting. To the extent that, following the rule change, the 
increase in the cost of deceitful disclosures discourages “bad” project creators from 
attempting to pool with “good” project creators by misreporting the quality of their projects, 
disclosure should become more informative of underlying project quality. 
Because project quality is ex-ante unobservable, our analysis focuses solely on 
successfully-funded projects. We gauge project quality based on the number of fraud 
allegations made by backers in the post-funding period ( 	 ). We expect the 
association between disclosure and 	  (our proxy for poor-quality projects) 
to become more negative after the rule change in states with stricter consumer protection 
laws. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7. The coefficient on 
 is negative and significant, which is consistent with disclosure becoming 




use.34  This finding is especially interesting, as it suggests that, after the rule change, 
disclosure increasingly helps backers to distinguish between good and bad projects even 
within the set of fully-funded projects (i.e., at the intensive margin). 
The evidence emerging from this analysis provides reassurance that the stronger 
association between disclosure and project funding following the change in terms of use is 
unlikely to be explained by backers increasingly falling for cheap talk.35 
 
4.8. Changes in Disclosure Attributes 
Our empirical findings so far document an increase in the association between 
disclosure and project success following the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use, which we 
regard as evidence of an improvement in the perceived credibility of disclosure. In this 
section, we investigate how creators enhance the credibility of their disclosures. To this end, 
we examine changes in the attributes of project disclosures along six dimensions: (i) length; 
(ii) readability; (iii) sentiment; (iv) lexical diversity; (v) use of specific terminology (e.g., the 
use of legal terms (i.e., legalese language)); and (vi) presence of quantitative information. We 
present the results of our disclosure attribute analysis in Table 8. 
Consistent with the idea that the rule change increases the expected benefits of 
disclosure, we expect that, following the rule change, creators provide longer campaign pitch 
and risk and challenges disclosures in states with stronger consumer protection regulation. In 
Column (1) of Panels A and B, we document a positive and significant coefficient on 
, in line with our expectations. 
                                                            
34 The positive and significant coefficient on   is also noteworthy. It suggests that, as the risk of 
litigation increases, projects with relatively lower levels of disclosure are more likely to be of lower quality. 
35 The results reported in Table OA-3 of the Online Appendix, which collectively point to an increase in the 
sentiment of backers, a lower incidence of delays in delivering rewards, and a decrease in the number of 
fraudulent projects in states with stricter consumer protection following the change in terms of use, as well as 
our analysis of the changes in disclosure attributes (see Section 4.8), further mitigate the concern that backers 




We expect disclosure readability to improve after the rule change, as disclosures that 
are easier to read and comprehend may be perceived as more credible and informative (Li, 
2008), whereas convoluted disclosures may be perceived as misleading and increase litigation 
risk if rewards are not delivered on time. We find that, while the readability of the risks and 
challenges section does not significantly change (Panel B, Column (2)), campaign pitch 
disclosures on average become more readable (Panel A, Column (2)).36,37 
Creators may refrain from writing very positive campaign pitches after the rule change 
and increase the use of negative language in the risks and challenges section to avoid legal 
liability. However, our results do not support this expectation as disclosure sentiment does 
not significantly change (Column (3) of Panels A and B).38 
After the introduction of the new terms of use, we expect creators to provide 
disclosures with higher information content, use more legalese language, and include more 
quantitative information in their project descriptions. Empirically, we document an 
improvement in lexical diversity (Column (4) of Panels A and B), consistent with an increase 
in the information content of project disclosures. Moreover, we find that, following the rule 
change, creators increasingly use legal terms (i.e., legalese language) in their campaign pitch 
(but not in the risks and challenges section) (Column (5) of Panels A and B).39,40 Finally, in 
                                                            
36 The number of years of education generally required to understand a text is on average 9.8 and 10.7 for the 
campaign pitch and risks and challenges section, respectively (untabulated). 
37 We obtain similar results (untabulated) when we use, instead, the Gunning Fog (Gunning, 1968) or the Smog 
(McLaughlin, 1969) indices as alternative measures of readability. In fact, the Flesch-Kincaid grade level, the 
Gunning Fog index, and the Smog index are strongly correlated. 
38 Although the overall sentiment does not significantly change, in untabulated analyses we find a significant 
increase in the use of constraining language (i.e., words such as “commit,” “forbid,” “impair,” “limit,” “restrict,” 
etc.) in both the campaign pitch and risks and challenges section following the change in terms of use 
(Bodnaruk, Loughran and McDonald, 2015). 
39 Our legalese measure has the advantage of being tailored to the language typically used on Kickstarter 
(Loughran and McDonald, 2015; Loughran and McDonald, 2016) but involves some discretion in compiling the 
respective list of words. In order to circumvent this potential drawback, we rely on the list of “litigious” words 
developed by Loughran and McDonald (see Loughran and McDonald, 2011). In untabulated tests, we 
consistently document a statistically significant increase in litigious language in the campaign pitch, but not in 
the risks and challenges section.  
40 In Section 6 of the Online Appendix, we provide evidence consistent with creators increasingly using words 




Column (6) of Panels A and B, we document an increase in the extent to which quantitative 
information is included in both the campaign pitch and risks and challenges disclosures. 
Taken together, the results of our disclosure attribute analysis suggest that the 
documented increase in the association between disclosure and project funding is driven, at 
least in part, by a change in disclosure attributes. 
 
4.9. Direct and Indirect Costs of Disclosure 
The documented positive association between project disclosures and funding success 
raises the question of why not all project creators move to a corner solution of maximum 
disclosure. When deciding on project disclosures, creators trade off the benefits of disclosing 
additional information with: (i) the indirect costs of revealing proprietary information that 
may be used by other entrepreneurs (i.e., proprietary costs of disclosure);41 and (ii) the direct 
costs of having, for example, to communicate with more potential backers.  
In Table 9, Panel A, we examine the role of proprietary costs of disclosure. We contend 
that, following the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use, creators of more innovative projects 
face higher proprietary costs of disclosure. Accordingly, we expect the effect of the rule 
change on the length of the campaign pitch and risk and challenges section to vary with the 
degree of project innovation. We measure project innovation using a dictionary of words 
developed by Mukherjee et al. (2017). Based on this dictionary, we assess whether creators 
make claims that their projects are “novel” and accordingly partition our sample projects into 
two subsamples. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
campaign pitches, and words such as “report,” “accountability,” “learn,” “check,” “questions,” and “campaign” 
in the risks and challenges section following the change in terms of use. 
41 See Quartz, Your brilliant Kickstarter idea could be on sale in China before you’ve even finished funding it, 
October 16, 2016 (available at: https://qz.com/771727/chinas-factories-in-shenzhen-can-copy-products-at-
breakneck-speed-and-its-time-for-the-rest-of-the-world-to-get-over-it/). The article describes a campaign 
launched in December 2015 by an Israeli entrepreneur for a smartphone case that unfolds into a selfie stick. One 
week after the campaign was launched, the entrepreneur found a cover with the same design he created on sale 




For less innovative projects, the coefficient on the interaction term  is 
positive and significant irrespective of the disclosure proxy we use (i.e., length of campaign 
pitch (Column (1)) or risks and challenges section (Column (3))). In contrast, for more 
innovative projects, while the coefficient on the interaction term  is always 
positive (Columns (2) and (4)), it is only significant when the disclosure proxy is the length 
of campaign pitch (Column (2)). Most importantly, we find a less pronounced increase in 
disclosure for more innovative projects (albeit not significantly so in the case of risks and 
challenges). This evidence is consistent with creators of more innovative projects trading off 
the benefits of disclosure against the potential costs of being copied by other entrepreneurs.42  
In Table 9, Panel B, we examine the role of direct costs of disclosure with a specific 
focus on communication costs. We expect that, after the rule change, project creators incur 
higher communication costs as a result of having to engage more frequently with a larger 
number of backers. We use three measures to gauge these communication costs. First, we 
construct a measure of creator involvement, which captures the frequency with which 
creators log into Kickstarter’s website. Second, we count the number of replies to backer 
comments by creators (or their collaborators). Third, we measure the length of these replies. 
Irrespective of the disclosure proxy we use, we find that disclosure is associated with higher 
creator involvement, as well as with more and longer replies to backers (as suggested by the 
positive and significant coefficient on ). Most importantly, these communication 
costs significantly increase after the rule change in states with stricter consumer protection, as 
evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient on . 
                                                            
42 Proprietary costs are arguably less relevant for information disclosed in the risks and challenges section. 
Therefore, the fact that the change in risks and challenges disclosures does not differ across more and less 
innovative projects is not surprising and further reassures us that the differential effect of the change in terms of 





Collectively, the results of these tests provide important evidence on the direct and 
indirect costs of disclosure and shed light into why not all creators may want to (equally) 
expand their disclosures following the introduction of the new terms of use. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We investigate how the interplay of disclosure and regulation shapes capital allocation 
in reward crowdfunding. Using data from Kickstarter, we show that, even in the absence of 
regulation and enforcement, disclosure helps creators access capital for their projects, which 
suggests that disclosure mitigates moral hazard and adverse selection. Most importantly, we 
find that disclosure becomes more credible (i.e., more strongly associated with funding 
success) as the potential litigation cost of false and misleading disclosure increases. This 
effect is more pronounced for U.S. states with stricter consumer protection laws. Also, we 
provide evidence of substantial heterogeneity in treatment effects: the increase in the 
perceived disclosure credibility is stronger for projects involving larger rewards, as well as in 
states whose courts are generally believed to handle criminal cases in a fairer way and, to a 
lesser extent, in states whose courts are less busy. Furthermore, we show that, following the 
change in Kickstarter’s terms of use, disclosures become longer, easier to read, more 
informative, and contain more quantitative information and legal terms. Finally, we provide 
evidence consistent with proprietary and communication costs of disclosure playing an 
important role in this market. These findings are likely to be of interest to project backers, 
creators, reward crowdfunding platforms, and regulators alike. 
In closing, a few caveats are in order. First, while in our analysis we control for a host 
of macroeconomic factors, because our treatment is concentrated in time, we cannot entirely 
rule out the possibility that other concurrent events may also affect the disclosure-funding 
relation. Second, as our analysis mainly focuses on a specific benefit of disclosure (i.e., the 




to other potential benefits of disclosure, such as improved project visibility. Relatedly, we 
cannot observe the amount of funding that projects subsequently raise outside the platform 
(e.g., from venture capitalists) or whether these projects eventually become viable businesses. 
Future research could examine the extent to which more transparent Kickstarter projects are 
more likely to later develop into profitable companies, spur product innovation, and 
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Appendix A: Consumer Protection Regulation 
 
A-1. Applicability and Landmark Lawsuits 
There is substantial variation in the scope of consumer protection regulation. While in 
some states a backer has to be classed as a consumer in a traditional sense, that is, “a person 
that buys goods and services,” in order to be afforded protection under state consumer laws, 
other states employ broader definitions to encompass, for example, “any person that suffers 
an ascertainable loss,” in Connecticut, and any private claimant that has suffered damage, in 
Arizona (Ganatra, 2016).  
Nevertheless, litigation may be possible (albeit more difficult) even in states that 
employ a more traditional consumer definition. This is because, while one might potentially 
argue that backers are not consumers and rewards are simply a token incentive to donate, 
pledges made on reward crowdfunding platforms are generally construed as “pre-purchases” 
(Hemingway, 2017). This was in fact the view taken by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
in its 2015 action against Erik Chevalier, who ran a Kickstarter campaign to raise funds to 
produce a board game. Paragraph 10 of the FTC complaint clearly states: “Crowdfunding 
transactions typically involve consumers (sometimes known as “backers”) giving money 
(known as a “pledge”) to a project “creator” in exchange for a specific “reward”.” As a 
result, false and misleading disclosures regarding the product and the failure to deliver 
rewards or refund backers were deemed a violation of the FTC Act and the defendant was 
ordered to pay U.S. $111,794.43  
A similar view was taken by the Washington State Attorney General, Bob Ferguson 
who, in 2015, successfully charged Ed Nash and his company, Altius Management, because 
of the Asylum Playing Cards Kickstarter campaign: “Washington state will not tolerate 
crowdfunding theft. If you accept money from consumers, and don’t follow through on your 
                                                            
43 The FTC complaint against Erik Chevalier specifically refers to misrepresentation and deceptive disclosure: 
“the representation as set forth in Paragraph 33 was and is false and misleading, and constitutes a deceptive 





obligations, my office will hold you accountable.” As a result of the suit, Ed Nash was 
ordered to pay U.S. $54,851 for violating the state Consumer Protection Act. Similarly, in 
September 2016 the Oregon State Attorney General confirmed that she was conducting an 
investigation into the Coolest Cooler campaign (which raised U.S. $13.2 million from 62,642 
backers on Kickstarter). In June 2017 Coolest Cooler reached a settlement with the Oregon 
Department of Justice.44  
 
A-2. Heterogeneity in Strength of State Consumer Protection Laws 
 U.S. states have their own consumer protection laws, the Unfair and Deceptive Acts 
and Practices (UDAP) statutes. These represent the main line of defense to protect consumers 
from predatory and deceptive business practices. The strength of UDAP statutes varies 
extensively from state to state along several dimensions.  
First, while some states broadly prohibit deception and/or unfairness, others confine the 
prohibition to a defined list of specific practices, making it harder to tackle new methods of 
deception and unfairness as they emerge. Also, some states prohibit acts that are deceptive, 
but not acts that are unfair, encompass very narrow types of deception and unfairness, or 
employ a very narrow consumer definition. Second, some states exempt specific industries 
(e.g., banks, insurers, regulated industries) from UDAP statutes. Third, while most state 
agencies have the authority to seek an injunction, restitution for consumers or civil penalties, 
several states limit the effectiveness of these forms of relief, namely by requiring the state 
agency to prove intent before seeking an injunction (e.g., Colorado, Indiana, Nevada, North 
Dakota, and Wyoming), prohibiting state agencies from seeking civil penalties (e.g., Rhode 
Island), or severely limiting the amount of civil penalties that can be sought (e.g., District of 
                                                            
44 In addition to agreeing to provide a certain number of coolers to its backers, the company was required to set 
aside 10% of its profits from future sales to fulfill commitments to other backers. The company: (i) agreed to 
pay U.S. $20 per cooler to all backers who do not receive their product by the middle of 2020; (ii) was forbidden 
from using rewards-based crowdfunding sites until all commitments to backers have been met; (iii) was required 
to submit financials to an outside accountant quarterly and to provide the Department of Justice access to 




Columbia, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee). Fourth, while in some states consumers 
can effectively supplement public enforcement by taking a business to court and seeking 
restitution and punitive damages, this is not as easy (or even impossible) in other states. For 
example, several states prohibit class action lawsuits, others require consumers to pay 
defendants attorney fees even if the suit is filed in good faith, and several prohibit enhanced 
damages (which would allow consumers to seek two or three times their actual damages). In 
contrast, in other states consumer regulation is stricter with laws allowing, for example, 
consumer lawsuits without pre-suit notice and proof of public impact, as well as class actions. 
In sum, there is considerable variation across states in the likelihood and expected outcomes 
of consumer litigation.  
 
A-3. State Consumer Protection Index 
 The heterogeneity in the strength of state consumer protection laws is highlighted by 
the National Consumer Law Center in their publication titled “Consumer Protection in the 
States: A 50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes.”  
 The report evaluates consumer protection laws in each U.S. state and the District of 
Columbia along four broad dimensions: their substantive prohibitions, their scope, the 
remedies they provide for the state enforcement agency, and the remedies they provide for 
consumers (see Table A-1). 
For each dimension, the strength of Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes 
(UDAP) statutes is rated as “weak,” “mixed or undecided” and “strong.” We first convert 
these qualitative attributes into numerical ratings taking the values of -1, 0, and 1 if a 
dimension is rated as “weak,” “mixed or undecided,” or “strong,” respectively. We then add 
these numerical ratings across all dimensions to form a summary state-level index. Table A-2 
presents descriptive information (for each U.S. state and the District of Columbia) on the 




Table A-1: Dimensions of State-Level Consumer Protection Regulation 
 
Prohibition of unfairness, deception 
 Broad deception prohibition  
 Broad unfairness prohibition 
 Rulemaking authority 
  
Scope 
 Covers credit 
 Covers insurance 
 Covers utilities 
 Covers post-sale acts 
 Covers real estate 
  
State enforcement 
 Civil penalty amount 
 Deception sufficient without proof of intent or knowledge 
  
Remedies for consumers 
 Compensatory damages for consumers 
 Multiple or punitive damages 
 Attorney fees for consumers 
 Class actions 
 Allows consumer suit without proof of public impact 
 Allows consumer suit without pre-suit notice 
This table presents the different dimensions of state-level consumer protection regulation analyzed by the 
National Consumer Law Center in their report titled “Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Report on 
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes.” For each dimension, the strength of Unfair and Deceptive 






Table A-2: Strength of Consumer Protection Regulation by U.S. State 
 






























New Hampshire 8 
New Jersey 13 
New Mexico 13 
New York 9 
North Carolina 13 





Rhode Island 6 
South Carolina 7 







West Virginia 8 
Wisconsin 12 
Wyoming 3 
This table provides descriptive information (for each U.S. state and the District of Columbia) on the consumer 
protection index that we use to construct the treatment variable in our analysis ( ). The index is 
computed based on the consumer protection regulation report published by the National Consumer Law Center 
and titled “Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices 
Statutes.” Consumer protection in each state is evaluated according to several dimensions (see Table A-1). For 
each dimension, the strength of Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes (UDAP) statutes is rated as 
“weak,” “mixed or undecided,” or “strong.” We first convert these qualitative attributes into numerical ratings 
taking the values of -1, 0, and 1 if a dimension is rated as “weak,” “mixed or undecided,” or “strong,” 








Success Variables  
 
  Indicator variable set equal to one if the amount pledged by backers is 
higher than a project’s funding goal, and zero otherwise (Source: 
Kickstarter). 
  Natural logarithm of the amount pledged to a project (Source: 
Kickstarter). 
 Natural logarithm of the number of project backers (Source: 
Kickstarter). 
	  Natural logarithm of the number of project backers that have not 
previously backed other projects on Kickstarter (Source: Kickstarter). 
	  Natural logarithm of the number of project backers that have 
previously backed other projects on Kickstarter (Source: Kickstarter). 
	  Natural logarithm of the length of comments made by backers in a 
project’s comments tab (Source: Kickstarter). 
	  Natural logarithm of the length of comments made by superbackers in 
a project’s comments tab. Superbackers are backers that have 
supported more than 25 projects with pledges of at least U.S. $10 in 




	  Natural logarithm of the length of a project’s campaign pitch in words 
(Source: Kickstarter). 
	 	  Natural logarithm of the length of a project’s risks and challenges 
section in words (Source: Kickstarter). 
 
 
The additive inverse of the Flesch-Kincaid grade level (Kincaid et al., 
1975) for the campaign pitch and risks and challenges section 
(calculated using the R “readability” package). The Flesch-Kincaid 
grade level provides an approximation of the number of years of 
education required for a reader to be able to parse and comprehend a 
text (Source: Kickstarter). 
 
 
Sentiment of the campaign pitch, or risks and challenges section, 
calculated as (Number of positive words - Number of negative 
words)/(Number of positive words + Number of negative words). 
Positive and negative words are identified based on Dictionary GI, a 
Dictionary with opinionated words from the Harvard-IV dictionary as 
in the General Inquirer software (calculated using the R 
“SentimentAnalysis” package) (Source: Kickstarter). 
	   Carroll’s Corrected Type-Token ratio (CTTR) for the campaign pitch 
(risks and challenges section), calculated as the ratio of different 
unique word stems (types) to the square root of twice the total number 
of words (tokens) (Jarvis, 2013) (Source: Kickstarter). 
 Indicator variable set equal to one if the campaign pitch (risks and 
challenges section) contains legalese language, and zero otherwise. 
Please refer to Appendix C for a list of legal terms (Source: 
Kickstarter). 
	   Natural logarithm of the number of numerals, including numbers and 
words expressing numbers, in the campaign pitch (risks and challenges 











  Natural logarithm of a project’s funding goal (Source: Kickstarter). 
 Natural logarithm of the duration of a project’s funding period in days 
(Source: Kickstarter). 
	 	 	   Indicator variable set equal to one if a project is chosen as “project of 
the day” by Kickstarter, and zero otherwise (Source: Kickstarter). 
	   Indicator variable set equal to one if a project has multiple creators, 
and zero otherwise (Source: Kickstarter). 
 Natural logarithm of the number of project rewards (Source: 
Kickstarter). 
Creator Controls  
	   Natural logarithm of the length of a project creator biography in words 
(Source: Kickstarter). 
	  Natural logarithm of the number of Kickstarter projects backed by a 
project creator (Source: Kickstarter). 
	   Natural logarithm of the number of Facebook friends of a project 




  Natural logarithm of the real state per capita GDP (chained 2012 
dollars) (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis). 
  Indicator variable set equal to one if a project is in a high-trust U.S. 
region, and zero otherwise. A U.S. region is classified as high trust if 
the percentage of “Yes” answers to the question “Do you think most 
people can be trusted?” in each region and year is above the country 
median for that year (Source: General Social Surveys, GSS). 
	   Percentage of respondents that have a computer at home in a project’s 
region (Source: General Social Surveys, GSS). 
	   Degree of bank concentration (Black and Strahan, 2002; Cetorelli and 
Strahan, 2006), calculated as the sum of the squared share of deposits 
for each banking company in a city (Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA)) averaged across all MSAs within a state (Source: Bank Call 
Reports, available at the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (FFIEC) website). 
	   Total amount pledged scaled by total funding goal in a project’s state 




 Indicator variable set equal to one if a project’s funding period starts 
after September 19, 2014, and zero otherwise. 
 Strength of state consumer protection law, reflecting the strength of 
state Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices (UDAP) statutes in four 
broad categories: their substantive prohibitions, their scope, the 
remedies they provide for the state enforcement agency, and the 
remedies they provide for consumers (Source: Calculated based on the 
National Consumer Law Center’s report on UDAP, available at: 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf). See 









Cross-Sectional Partition Variables 
 
	   Largest reward offered for a project (Source: Kickstarter). 
	 	  Percentage of respondents to the General Social Survey in a project’s 
region that believe that courts in their respective area deal well with 
criminals (i.e., respondents that answer “About right” to the question 
“In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or 
not harshly enough with criminals?”) (Source: General Social Survey, 
available at http://gss.norc.org/). 
	 Total caseload per capita in a project’s state courts. The total caseload 
is the sum of all incoming (newly filed, reopened, and reactivated) 
cases reported by a state. It comprises civil, domestic relations, 
criminal, juvenile, and traffic violations cases (Source: Court Statistics 
Project by the National Center for State Courts, available at 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/). 
   
Project Quality Variable  
	    Number of fraud allegations made by backers of a successfully-funded 
project in the comments tab scaled by number of backers. Fraud 
allegations are identified using the fraud word list presented in 
Appendix C (Source: Kickstarter). 
 
Disclosure Cost Variables 
 
	   Indicator variable set equal to one if the campaign pitch includes at 
least one of the words in the “novel” word list (Mukherjee et al., 2017) 
presented in Appendix C, and zero otherwise (Source: Kickstarter). 
	   Additive inverse of the number of days from the last creator login to 
Kickstarter.com to the end of the funding period (Source: Kickstarter). 
	   Natural logarithm of the number of replies to backers by creators and 
their collaborators (Source: Kickstarter). 
	 	    Natural logarithm of the length of replies to backers by creators and 




Appendix C: Lists of Words  
 
Variable Words 
Delay Delay (Delays, Delayed, Delaying) 
Late 
Fraud Fraud (Frauds, Fraudulent, Defraud, Defrauds, Defrauded, Defrauding) 
Scam (Scams, Scamming, Scammed, Scammer, Scammers) 
Lie (Lies, Lying) 
Deceive (Deceives, Deceived, Deceiving) 
Sham  
Hoax 
Forgery (Forgeries, Forged, Forging) 
Counterfeit (Counterfeits, Counterfeited) 
Thief (Thieves, Theft) 
Steal (Steals, Stealing, Stole, Stolen) 
Mislead (Misleads, Misleading, Misled) 
Trickster (Tricksters, Tricking, Tricked) 
Fake (Fakes, Faked, Faking) 
Charlatan (Charlatans) 
Legalese Disclaim (Disclaimer, Disclaiming) 
Liability (Liabilities, Liable) 
Clause (Clauses) 
Comply (Complies, Compliance, Complying) 
Legal  
Contract (Contracts, Contractual) 
Damage (Damages, Damaging) 
Law (Laws) 
Regulation (Regulations) 
Consumer Protection (Consumer Protections, Consumer Law, Consumer Laws, Consumer Right, 
Consumer Rights) 
Obligation (Obligations, Obliged) 




















Figure 1: Strength of Consumer Protection Regulation 
 
 
This figure shows the differential strength of consumer protection laws across U.S. states. Dark (light) blue 












This figure plots counterfactual treatment effects over our sample period. We map out these effects by replacing, in equation (1),  and its two- and three-way interactions 
















































September 20, 2014 to March 19, 2015 (  and after March 19, 2015 ( ) and their respective two- and three-way interactions with  and . Our 
treatment effects are captured by the three-way interactions of each of the four separate time indicators with  and . The upper left (right) plot reports 
treatment effect estimates and respective 95% confidence intervals of a model specification in which the dependent variable is  and the disclosure variable is 
	  ( 	 	 ). The lower left (right) plot reports treatment effect estimates and respective 95% confidence intervals of a model 
specification in which the dependent variables is  and the disclosure variable is 	  ( 	 	 ). Project, creator, and 




Figure 3: Border Counties 
 
 
This figure shows contiguous U.S. counties located at state border segments (dark blue areas) that we use in our 






Table 1: Sample Selection and Composition 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection Criteria 
Projects downloaded on July 15, 2017 332,364 
- Exclude projects with missing funding period (417) 
- Exclude projects with missing location country (1,772) 
- Exclude foreign projects (75,131) 
- Exclude projects with missing location state (24) 
- Exclude projects with zero funding goal (3) 
Final Sample 255,017 
 
Panel B: Projects by Year 
Year Obs. % 
2009 912 0.36 
2010 8,971 3.52 
2011 25,385 9.95 
2012 39,348 15.43 
2013 38,812 15.22 
2014 50,786 19.91 
2015 46,348 18.17 
2016 30,009 11.77 
2017 14,446 5.66 
Total 255,017 100.00 
 
Panel C: Projects by Category 
Category Obs. % 
Film and Video 65,363 25.63 
Music 30,183 11.84 
Publishing 26,866 10.53 
Games 21,758 8.53 
Art 18,307 7.18 
Technology 17,518 6.87 
Design 17,386 6.82 
Food 15,669 6.14 
Fashion 14,273 5.60 
Comics 7,954 3.12 
Photography 6,593 2.59 
Crafts 3,048 1.20 
Dance 2,851 1.12 
Journalism 2,849 1.12 
Theatre 2,301 0.90 
Craft 2,098 0.82 
Total 255,017 100.00 
 
Panel D: Projects by Size 
Size Obs. % 
Goal < U.S. $5,000 108,724 42.63
U.S. $5,000 ≤ Goal < U.S. $10,000 50,823 19.93
U.S. $10,000 ≤ Goal < U.S. $15,000 26,528 10.40
Goal ≥ U.S. $15,000 68,942 27.04




Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel E: Descriptive Statistics 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. P10 P25 Median P75 P90 
Success variables:   
 255,017 0.386 0.487 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 255,017 6,597 16,344 0 281 1,691 5,442 14,000 
 255,017 79 210 0 2 15 61 172 
	  255,017 27 58 0 0 5 29 71 
	  255,017 50 161 0 0 4 26 98 
	  255,017 107 294 0 0 0 46 281 
	  255,017 22 86 0 0 0 0 31 
         
Disclosure variables:         
	  255,017 585 471 166 266 443 750 1,190 
	 	 188,915 127 88 45 67 103 159 239 
  
Project variables:   
 255,017 18,124 41,167 780 2,000 5,000 15,000 40,000 
 255,017 34 13 21 30 30 38 60 
	 	 	  255,017 0.008 0.087 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
	  255,017 0.043 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 255,017 8 5 2 4 7 10 14 
         
Creator variables:         
	  255,017 103 107 14 39 76 119 227 
	  255,017 6 14 0 0 1 4 14 
	  255,017 543 973 0 0 43 687 1,595 
          
Macro-level variables:          
  255,017 55,435 14,945 41,643 46,242 55,520 60,357 67,379 
  255,017 0.459 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
	   255,017 0.852 0.049 0.797 0.819 0.832 0.909 0.909 
	   255,017 0.517 0.132 0.336 0.414 0.527 0.588 0.692 
	 255,017 0.350 0.186 0.141 0.205 0.338 0.453 0.558 
This table presents the sample selection procedure and the sample composition. Panel A describes the sample 
selection procedure. Panels B, C, and D present the distribution of sample projects by year, category, and size, 
respectively. Panel E provides descriptive statistics for different measures of project success, as well as for 
disclosure, project, creator, and macro-level variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 




Table 2: Disclosure and Project Success 
 
Panel A: Probability of Success 
 Dependent variable:  
 Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS 
 Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Disclosure variables:       
0.234*** 0.027***   0.258*** 0.031*** 
 (12.15) (9.40)   (16.14) (8.34) 
	    0.263*** 0.031*** 0.138*** 0.015*** 
  (12.70) (12.57) (7.20) (6.38) 
Project controls:       
 -0.586*** -0.079*** -0.564*** -0.073*** -0.583*** -0.074*** 
 (-40.57) (-25.06) (-34.06) (-23.39) (-37.79) (-23.44) 
-0.523*** -0.086*** -0.531*** -0.081*** -0.526*** -0.081*** 
 (-21.41) (-20.25) (-18.20) (-18.34) (-18.15) (-18.26) 
	 3.170*** 0.361*** 3.030*** 0.357*** 2.980*** 0.352*** 
 (23.08) (15.79) (19.71) (17.24) (19.55) (16.95) 
	 0.522*** 0.085*** 0.485*** 0.076*** 0.484*** 0.076*** 
 (18.76) (16.21) (18.46) (16.72) (18.65) (16.57) 
1.035*** 0.133*** 1.107*** 0.136*** 1.034*** 0.126*** 
(38.22) (28.72) (33.90) (24.73) (32.47) (26.86) 
Creator controls:       
	 0.138*** 0.020*** 0.138*** 0.019*** 0.128*** 0.018*** 
 (7.59) (8.38) (5.80) (6.59) (5.44) (6.09) 
0.714*** 0.131*** 0.719*** 0.131*** 0.701*** 0.128*** 
 (56.72) (58.43) (59.40) (66.71) (57.91) (67.95) 
 0.012*** 0.002*** 0.018*** 0.003*** 0.019*** 0.003*** 
 (4.06) (4.15) (5.70) (6.11) (6.05) (6.36) 
Macro controls:       
 0.808* 0.067 0.898 0.072 0.876 0.067 
 (1.92) (0.98) (1.55) (0.82) (1.56) (0.78) 
 0.044 0.009** 0.016 0.004 0.018 0.005 
 (1.63) (2.05) (0.51) (1.13) (0.58) (1.23) 
	 1.115** 0.138 1.773*** 0.243** 1.735*** 0.236** 





Table 2: (continued) 
 
(continued) 
 Dependent variable:  
 Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS 
 Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Macro controls:       
	 0.433 0.091* 0.250 0.042 0.279 0.045 
 (1.36) (1.71) (0.60) (0.75) (0.64) (0.79) 
	  0.112** 0.019** 0.057 0.014 0.063 0.015 
  (2.44) (2.32) (0.94) (1.44) (1.00) (1.46) 
Subcategory fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-month fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Obs. 255,017 255,017 188,915 188,915 188,915 188,915 
Pseudo R2 0.291  0.305  0.308  




Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Amount Pledged  
 Dependent variable:  
 Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) 
Disclosure variables:    
0.432***  0.441*** 
 (23.20)  (26.03) 
	   0.310*** 0.083*** 
 (12.91) (4.87) 
Project controls:    
 0.043** 0.066*** 0.044** 
 (2.53) (3.51) (2.38) 
-0.048 -0.037 -0.031 
 (-1.30) (-0.88) (-0.72) 
	 1.482*** 1.545*** 1.466*** 
 (15.49) (17.80) (17.18) 
	 0.555*** 0.543*** 0.537*** 
 (16.64) (14.58) (14.98) 
1.257*** 1.399*** 1.262*** 
(28.94) (27.34) (26.07) 
Creator controls:    
	  0.057*** 0.060*** 0.041*** 
 (5.53) (4.33) (3.03) 
 0.560*** 0.585*** 0.552*** 
 (33.19) (40.36) (38.85) 
 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (4.92) (5.65) (6.04) 
Macro controls:    
 0.824** 1.182** 1.111* 
 (2.13) (2.08) (2.00) 
 0.024* -0.007 -0.001 
 (1.78) (-0.53) (-0.05) 
	  1.179** 1.852*** 1.753*** 





Table 2 (continued) 
 
 (continued) 
 Dependent variable:  
 Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) 
Macro controls:    
	  0.629** 0.223 0.267 
 (2.49) (0.63) (0.74) 
	  0.134*** 0.127* 0.134** 
 (3.14) (1.99) (2.07) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 255,017 188,915 188,915 
Adj. R2 0.330 0.352 0.357 
This table presents the results of the analysis that examines the association between disclosure and project success. Panel A reports the coefficients from the estimation of a 
set of logistic (Columns (1), (3), and (5)) and OLS (Columns (2), (4), and (6)) regressions. The dependent variable is , an indicator variable set equal to one if a 
project’s funding goal is reached, and zero otherwise. Model specifications presented in Columns (1), (3), and (5) include state, subcategory, and year-month fixed effects, 
whereas model specifications presented in Columns (2), (4), and (6) include state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects. Panel B reports the coefficients from the 
estimation of a set of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is , the natural logarithm of the amount pledged to a project. All model specifications include 
state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects. The table reports (in parentheses) t-statistics and z-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 




Table 3: The Role of Consumer Protection 
 
Panel A: Probability of Success 
 Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:   :  
 Logit OLS  Logit OLS 
 Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
0.174*** 0.012*** 0.248*** 0.020*** 
 (5.74) (3.07) (8.21) (5.15) 
-0.187*** -0.023*** -0.069*** -0.009*** 
 (-6.82) (-7.74) (-3.15) (-3.76) 
 0.020 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.61) (0.52) (-0.07) (-0.30) 
 -0.006* 0.000 -0.006* 0.000 
 (-1.90) (0.21) (-1.69) (0.54) 
 0.030*** 0.004*** 0.015*** 0.002*** 
 (6.86) (7.63) (3.23) (3.64) 
Project controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Subcategory fixed effects Yes No  Yes No 
State fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year-month fixed effects Yes No  Yes No 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects No Yes  No Yes 
Obs. 255,017 255,017  188,915 188,915 
Pseudo R2 0.292  0.305  




Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Amount Pledged  
 Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:   Disclosure variable:  
 Independent variables: (1)  (2) 
0.356*** 0.230*** 
 (9.41) (4.91) 
-0.143*** -0.065*** 
 (-6.05) (-4.30) 
0.018 0.015 
 (0.56) (0.38) 
-0.003 -0.004 
 (-0.65) (-0.90) 
 0.025*** 0.023*** 
 (6.16) (4.68) 
Project controls Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes 
Obs. 255,017  188,915 
Adj. R2 0.331  0.352 
This table reports the results of the analysis that examines how the association between disclosure and project success changes following the introduction of Kickstarter’s new 
terms of use. Panel A reports the coefficients from the estimation of a set of logistic (Columns (1) and (3)) and OLS (Columns (2) and (4)) regressions. The dependent 
variable is . The model specifications presented in Columns (1) and (3) include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as state, subcategory, and 
year-month fixed effects, whereas the model specifications presented in Columns (2) and (4) include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as state and 
subcategory×year-month fixed effects.  is an indicator variable set equal to one if a project’s funding period starts after September 19, 2014, and zero otherwise. 
 is a measure of the strength of consumer protection in the respective project’s state. Panel B reports the coefficients from the estimation of a set of OLS regressions. 
The dependent variable is . All model specifications include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as state and subcategory×year-month 
fixed effects. The table reports (in parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * denote 





Table 4: Mitigating the Influence of State-Level Time-Varying Factors  
 
Panel A: Short Event Windows 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
     
      
 1, 1  2, 2   1, 1  2, 2   1, 1  2, 2   1, 1  2, 2  
 Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 0.010** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.020***  0.392*** 0.375*** 0.232*** 0.230*** 
 (2.24) (4.56) (2.85) (5.16)  (6.60) (9.13) (3.72) (4.90) 
 -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.003 -0.009***  -0.158*** -0.147*** -0.096*** -0.095*** 
 (-3.89) (-6.97) (-1.24) (-3.73)  (-4.20) (-5.81) (-3.48) (-4.29) 
 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.001  -0.007 0.018 -0.011 0.015 
 (-0.96) (0.28) (-1.09) (-0.30)  (-0.32) (0.58) (-0.37) (0.38) 
 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000  -0.003 -0.005 0.000 -0.004 
 (2.83) (0.61) (3.17) (0.53)  (-0.39) (-0.99) (0.01) (-0.90) 
 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.002***  0.028*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
 (3.85) (6.84) (1.18) (3.61)  (4.51) (5.99) (3.86) (4.67) 
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 97,048 211,146  96,858 188,876  97,048 211,146  96,858 188,876 






Table 4: (continued) 
 
Panel B: Border County Analysis 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
     
 Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
0.013*** 0.021** 0.021*** 0.019** 0.361*** 0.404*** 0.240*** 0.224*** 
 (3.13) (2.34) (5.87) (2.08) (10.06) (8.76) (5.06) (4.11) 
-0.024*** -0.027*** -0.008*** -0.008** -0.139*** -0.154*** -0.085*** -0.102*** 
 (-7.54) (-6.39) (-2.86) (-2.39) (-5.55) (-5.48) (-3.52) (-3.87) 
0.003 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.019 0.008 0.013 -0.005 
 (0.92) (1.13) (0.09) (0.22) (0.55) (0.29) (0.34) (-0.19) 
-0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 
 (-0.37) (-1.68) (0.50) (-0.14) (-0.80) (-1.55) (-0.76) (-0.73) 
 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 
 (7.34) (5.39) (2.79) (2.38) (5.69) (5.62) (3.88) (4.76) 
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subcategory fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-month fixed effects Yes No Yes No  Yes No Yes No 
Border × Year-month fixed effects No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Obs. 254,792 87,454  188,744 63,293  254,792 87,454  188,744 63,293 






Table 4: (continued) 
 
Panel C: Fixed Effects Analysis 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
       	  
 Independent variables: (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.024*** 0.322*** 0.306*** 0.276*** 0.187** 0.162** 0.192*** 
 (1.43) (1.40) (1.22) (3.37) (2.97) (3.40) (5.84) (5.47) (5.31) (2.42) (2.08) (2.81) 
 0.011 0.009 0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.122 0.123 0.114 0.121 0.134 0.141 
 (1.23) (1.14) (0.08) (0.58) (0.56) (-0.45) (1.42) (1.45) (1.42) (1.20) (1.28) (1.39) 
 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.61) (0.85) (0.94) (1.09) (0.95) (-0.23) (0.32) (0.41) (1.19) (0.49) (0.42) (-0.34) 
 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001* 0.001** 0.003*** 0.014* 0.014* 0.016** 0.010 0.012 0.015* 
 (3.31) (3.81) (5.21) (1.81) (2.02) (2.92) (1.80) (1.92) (2.19) (1.19) (1.36) (1.73) 
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subcategory fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No  Yes No No Yes No No 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects No Yes No No Yes No  No Yes No No Yes No 
State × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes No Yes Yes No  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Subcategory × State × Year-month fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes  No No Yes No No Yes 
Obs. 255,017 255,017 255,017  188,915 188,915 188,915  255,017 255,017 255,017  188,915 188,915 188,915 
Adj. R2 0.335 0.367 0.607  0.343 0.376 0.628  0.315 0.345 0.614  0.332 0.364 0.641 
This table presents the results of tests aimed at mitigating concerns related to state-level time-varying macro factors. Panel A presents coefficient estimates based on the model specifications 
reported in Table 3, Panel A, Columns (2) and (4), and Table 3, Panel B, Columns (1) and (2) restricting the sample to shorter time windows of one and two years before and after the change in 
terms of use (odd-numbered and even-numbered columns, respectively). Panel B presents coefficient estimates from our border-county analysis. Panel C examines different fixed effects 
structures. The dependent variable is  (Columns (1) to (4) of Panels A and B and Columns (1) to (6) of Panel C) and  (Columns (5) to (8) of Panels A and B and Columns 
(7) to (12) of Panel C).  is measured as 	  (Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) of Panels A and B and Columns (1), (2), (3), (7), (8), and (9) of Panel C) and as 
	 	  in Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) of Panels A and B and Columns (4), (5), (6), (10), (11), and (12) of Panel C). In Panel A, model specifications are estimated using 
OLS and include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects. In Panel B, model specifications are estimated using OLS and 
include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as subcategory, county, and year-month fixed effects in odd-numbered columns, and subcategory, county, and border×year-
month fixed effects in even-numbered columns. In Panel C, model specifications are estimated using OLS and include project and creator control variables, as well as subcategory and state×year-
month fixed effects in Columns (1), (4), (7), and (10), subcategory×year-month and state×year-month fixed effects in  Columns (2), (5), (8), and (11), and  subcategory×state×year-month fixed 
effects in Columns (3), (6), (9), and (12). The table reports (in parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * denote 





Table 5: Consumer Protection and Project Backers 
 
Panel A: Number of Backers 
 Dependent variable:  
Disclosure variable:   Disclosure variable:  
 Independent variables: (1)  (2) 
0.221*** 0.127*** 
 (9.04) (4.51) 
-0.088*** -0.052*** 
 (-7.30) (-4.50) 
 0.011 0.009 
 (0.79) (0.55) 
 0.003 0.003 
 (1.29) (1.02) 
 0.015*** 0.012*** 
 (7.57) (4.73) 
Project controls Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes 
Obs. 255,017  188,915 




Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Type of Backers 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
  Disclosure variable:   Disclosure variable:   Disclosure variable:   Disclosure variable: 
    
 Independent variables: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.155*** 0.096*** 0.176*** 0.084** 
 (5.79) (3.46) (5.83) (2.45) 
-0.052*** -0.039*** -0.097*** -0.046*** 
 (-5.53) (-4.37) (-7.07) (-4.93) 
0.008 0.009 0.013 0.010 
 (1.26) (0.70) (0.90) (0.69) 
0.008*** 0.007** 0.006* 0.007* 
 (2.96) (2.45) (1.78) (1.75) 
 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.010*** 
 (5.49) (4.13) (7.15) (4.81) 
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 255,017  188,915  255,017  188,915 





Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Backer Engagement 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
      
 Independent variables: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.189*** 0.067** 0.105*** 0.064*** 
 (6.73) (2.55) (5.39) (3.29) 
-0.030** -0.027** -0.074*** -0.031*** 
 (-2.22) (-2.33) (-5.28) (-4.22) 
0.027*** 0.041*** 0.019 0.014* 
 (2.82) (2.74) (1.35) (1.77) 
0.009*** 0.008** -0.004* -0.002 
 (3.05) (2.63) (-1.87) (-1.08) 
 0.005* 0.006* 0.012*** 0.007*** 
 (1.98) (1.97) (5.15) (3.62) 
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 255,017  188,915  255,017  188,915 
Adj. R2 0.351  0.378  0.374  0.385 
This table presents the result of the analysis that examines how the association between project disclosure and (i) number of backers (Panel A), (ii) type of backers (Panel B), 
and (iii) backer engagement (Panel C) changes following the introduction of Kickstarter’s new terms of use. The dependent variable is	  in Panel A, 
	  and 	  in Panel B, and 	  and 	  in Panel C. In all panels,  is 
measured as 	  in odd-numbered columns and 	 	  in even-numbered columns. All model specifications are estimated using 
OLS and include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects. The table reports (in parentheses) t-statistics 
based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), 





Table 6: Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 
Panel A: Reward Magnitude 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
    	  
     
 Low High  Low High  Low High  Low High 
 Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 0.013** 0.015*** 0.031*** 0.013* 0.365*** 0.390*** 0.279*** 0.254*** 
 (2.64) (2.77) (5.73) (1.96) (7.57) (9.36) (5.18) (4.52) 
 -0.016*** -0.024*** -0.004** -0.009*** -0.110*** -0.166*** -0.060*** -0.121*** 
 (-4.84) (-8.30) (-2.34) (-3.28) (-4.73) (-5.59) (-2.85) (-5.33) 
0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.024 0.008 0.016 0.001 
 (0.70) (-0.05) (-0.91) (-0.32) (0.85) (0.20) (0.49) (0.02) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.007* -0.002 -0.013*** 
 (0.52) (0.12) (0.84) (0.23) (-0.64) (-1.80) (-0.32) (-2.74) 
 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.028*** 
 (4.33) (8.21) (2.13) (3.22) (4.85) (5.97) (3.26) (5.60) 
Project controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Test for difference in           
χ2-test p-value: Low = High 0.0271  0.0538  0.0295  0.0056 
Obs. 133,197 121,687  104,096 84,754  133,197 121,687  104,096 84,754 





Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Confidence in Courts 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
  	   	  
  	 	   	 	  
 Low High  Low High  Low High  Low High 
 Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 0.010** 0.024*** 0.018*** 0.032*** 0.361*** 0.376*** 0.234*** 0.275*** 
 (2.40) (3.14) (3.81) (4.47) (10.17) (7.21) (4.39) (4.21) 
 -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.005 -0.012*** -0.142*** -0.149*** -0.070** -0.116*** 
 (-6.06) (-7.54) (-1.31) (-4.94) (-4.14) (-5.66) (-2.24) (-5.09) 
0.006*** -0.004 0.005* -0.007 0.066 -0.031 0.081 -0.050* 
 (2.76) (-1.27) (1.72) (-1.68) (1.45) (-1.38) (1.37) (-1.99) 
-0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.011* 
 (-0.11) (-0.91) (0.68) (-1.31) (-0.74) (-0.86) (-0.31) (-1.74) 
 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.017** 0.029*** 
 (6.08) (8.02) (1.36) (4.90) (4.16) (6.37) (2.54) (6.30) 
Project controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Test for difference in           
χ2-test p-value: Low = High 0.0540  0.0262  0.5955  0.0904 
Obs. 104,779 150,238  76,627 112,288  104,779 150,238  76,627 112,288 





Table 6 (continued) 
Panel C: Court Caseload 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
  	   	  
     
 Low High  Low High  Low High  Low High 
 Independent variables: (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 0.010 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.354*** 0.389*** 0.189*** 0.282*** 
 (1.52) (2.99) (2.99) (4.83) (8.79) (8.40) (4.47) (4.64) 
 -0.027*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.006** -0.147*** -0.150*** -0.107*** -0.087*** 
 (-8.41) (-4.71) (-3.65) (-2.04) (-6.36) (-4.42) (-4.41) (-3.18) 
0.000 0.005 -0.002 0.004 -0.006 0.053 -0.014 0.062 
 (0.19) (1.49) (-0.59) (0.97) (-0.23) (1.27) (-0.47) (1.26) 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.009 
 (0.63) (-0.36) (0.41) (-0.02) (-0.64) (-1.26) (-0.44) (-1.40) 
 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.019*** 
 (7.95) (4.68) (3.27) (1.90) (6.30) (4.45) (4.78) (3.35) 
Project controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Test for difference in           
χ2-test p-value: Low = High 0.0222  0.1280  0.9782  0.3751 
Obs. 141,685 113,332  101,361 87,554  141,685 113,332  101,361 87,554 
Adj. R2 0.368 0.379  0.380 0.393  0.359 0.346  0.385 0.362 
This table reports the results of the analysis that examines how the effect of the introduction of Kickstarter’s new terms of use on the association between disclosure and project success 
varies, in the cross-section, with the extent of reward magnitude (Panel A), confidence in courts (Panel B), and court caseload (Panel C). In all panels, the dependent variable is  in 
Columns (1) to (4) and  in Columns (5) to (8), whereas  is measured as 	  in Columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) and 	 	  
in Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8). In Panel A, sample projects are partitioned based on the median magnitude of the largest reward associated with a project. A project is classified as having 
Low (High) rewards if the respective largest reward offered ( 	 ) is below (above) the median across all projects. In Panel B, sample projects are partitioned based on the 
degree of confidence in courts in the respective U.S. region. A region is classified as having Low (High) confidence in courts if the percentage of respondents of the General Social Survey 
in the project’s region that believe that courts in the respective area deal well with criminals ( 	 	 ) is higher than the median across all U.S. regions. In Panel C, sample 
projects are partitioned based on the caseload per capita of their respective state courts. A state court is classified as having Low (High) caseload if the respective court caseload ( ) 
is below (above) the median across all U.S. states. We report p-values from a χ2-test for the difference in the interaction terms 	accross the Low and High 
columns. All model specifications are estimated using OLS and include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects. The 
table reports (in parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 




Table 7: Disclosure and Project Quality 
 
 Dependent variable: 	  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
   	 	
 Independent variables: (1)  (2) 
 0.051 0.036 
 (1.30) (0.81) 
 0.038*** 0.035*** 
 (3.56) (2.71) 
 -0.009 0.023 
 (-0.53) (1.31) 
0.000 -0.001 
 (0.02) (-0.25) 
 -0.006*** -0.008*** 
 (-3.14) (-3.53) 
Project controls Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes 
Obs. 50,882  33,537 
Adj. R2 0.187  0.216 
This table reports the results of the analysis that examines how the association between disclosure and project 
quality changes following the introduction of Kickstarter’s new terms of use. The dependent variable is 
	 , the number of fraud allegations made by backers of a successfully-funded project in the 
comments tab scaled by number of backers. Fraud allegations are identified using the fraud word list presented 
in Appendix C.  is 	  in Column (1) and 	 	  in 
Column (2). All model specifications are estimated using OLS and include project, creator, and macro-level 
control variables, as well as state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects. The table reports (in parentheses) t-
statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined 




Table 8: Disclosure Attributes 
 
Panel A: Campaign Pitch 
 Dependent variable: Disclosure Attribute 
 Length Readability Sentiment Lexical Diversity Legalese Quantitative Information 
 Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
0.003*** 0.009*** 0.000 0.005*** 0.001** 0.002* 
 (3.79) (3.75) (1.66) (3.04) (2.27) (1.98) 
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 255,017 255,017 255,017 255,017 255,017 255,017 
Adj. R2 0.387 0.127 0.116 0.390 0.105 0.301 
 
 
Panel B: Risks and Challenges 
 Dependent variable: Disclosure Attribute 
 Length Readability Sentiment Lexical Diversity Legalese Quantitative Information 
 Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  0.002*** -0.002 0.000 0.003** -0.000 0.001** 
 (2.84) (-0.70) (1.13) (2.54) (-0.13) (2.34) 
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 188,915 188,915 188,915 188,915 188,915 188,915 
Adj. R2 0.239 0.086 0.068 0.235 0.061 0.127 
This table reports the results of the analysis that examines changes in disclosure attributes following the introduction of Kickstarter’s new terms of use. The results presented 
in Panel A (Panel B) pertain to disclosure attributes of a project’s campaign pitch (risks and challenges section). The dependent variable is the individual Disclosure Attribute 
(i.e., length, readability, sentiment, lexical diversity, legalese, or quantitative information). In Column (1) of Panel A (Panel B), Length is measured as 	  
( 	 	 ). In Column (2) of Panel A (Panel B), Readability is measured as the additive inverse of the Flesch-Kincaid grade level of the campaign pitch 




words + Number of negative words) of the campaign pitch (risks and challenges section). In Column (4) of Panel A (Panel B), Lexical Diversity is measured as the Carroll’s 
Corrected Type-Token ratio (CTTR) for the campaign pitch (risks and challenges section). In Column (5) of Panel A (Panel B), Legalese is an indicator variable set equal to 
one if the campaign pitch (risks and challenges section) contains legal terms, and zero otherwise. In Column (6) of Panel A (Panel B), Quantitative Information is measured 
as the number of numerals in the campaign pitch (risks and challenges section) (including numbers and words expressing numbers). All model specifications are estimated 
using OLS and include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects. The table reports (in parentheses) t-
statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 




Table 9: Disclosure Costs 
 
Panel A: Proprietary Costs of Disclosure 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
    
  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 Independent variables: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.004*** 0.002** 0.003** 0.001 
 (3.96) (2.06) (2.44) (0.96) 
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Test for difference in          
    χ2-test p-value: No = Yes 0.0581  0.1116 
Obs. 77,152  177,865  55,265  133,650 




Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Direct Costs of Disclosure 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:   Dependent variable: 	 	  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
  	        	 	  
 Independent variables: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 0.708*** 0.560*** 0.052***  0.020*  0.171*** 0.074** 
 (8.98) (6.95) (5.78)  (1.70)  (7.46) (2.43) 
 -0.632*** -0.378*** -0.015***  -0.007***  -0.034*** -0.023*** 
 (-9.18) (-7.95) (-4.31)  (-3.78)  (-3.27) (-2.74) 
 0.058 0.009 0.006**  0.007***  0.009 0.012* 
 (0.60) (0.12) (2.45)  (3.80)  (1.52) (1.98) 
 -0.055*** -0.051*** 0.001  0.002  0.005* 0.005 
 (-6.97) (-5.60) (1.44)  (1.20)  (1.87) (1.22) 
 0.108*** 0.091*** 0.002***  0.001***  0.005*** 0.005** 
 (9.58) (8.94) (3.69)  (3.34)  (2.88) (2.40) 
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 255,017  188,915  255,017  188,915  255,017  188,915 
Adj. R2 0.194  0.206  0.336  0.358  0.321  0.346 
This table reports the results of the analysis that examines direct and indirect costs of disclosure. Panel A presents evidence on proprietary costs of disclosure by examining how the change in 
disclosure following the introduction of Kickstarter’s new terms of use varies, in cross-section, with the degree of project innovation. The dependent variable is the length of the campaign pitch 
( 	 ) in Columns (1) and (2) and the length of the risks and challenges section ( 	 	 ) in Columns (3) and (4). Sample projects are partitioned into two 
subsamples based on whether they are innovative. A project is classified as being innovative ( 	 ) if the campaign pitch includes at least one of the words in the “novel” word list 
(Mukherjee et al., 2017) presented in Appendix C. We report p-values from a χ2-test for the difference in the interaction term 	accross the No and Yes columns. 
Panel B presents evidence on direct costs of disclosure. The dependent variable is 	  in Columns (1) and (2), 	  in Columns (3) and (4), and 
	 	  in Columns (5) and (6), whereas  is 	  in Columns (1), (3), and (5) and 	 	  in Columns (2), (4), and (6). 
All model specifications are estimated using OLS and include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects. The table reports (in 
parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-
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1. Change in Perceptions of Creator Legal Liability and Backer Legal Protection 
A maintained assumption underlying our test design is that, while prior to the rule change 
there was limited awareness that consumer protection laws would apply to Kickstarter creators 
and backers (see Ganatra, 2016), the revision of Kickstarter’s terms of use altered perceptions 
of creator legal liability and backer legal protection. In other words, we contend that the new 
rules changed the perceived litigation risk faced by project creators and, consequently, the legal 
recourse opportunities for backers, even though the actual consumer protection laws did not 
change. To provide support for this assumption, we take a four-pronged approach. First, we 
document the different means through which Kickstarter advertised the change in terms of use. 
Second, we analyze mainstream and tech-dedicated media reactions to the rule change. Third, 
we investigate how the change in terms of use was discussed on social media. Finally, we 
conduct empirical tests whose evidence further backs our claim that the rule change 
significantly increased the awareness of creators and backers regarding the applicability of 
consumer protection laws to crowdfunding. We explain our approach in more detail in the 
following sections. 
 
1.1. Announcement of the Change in Kickstarter’s Terms of Use 
We explore how Kickstarter publicized the introduction of its new terms of use. We find 
that the rule change was widely announced on Kickstarter’s website, on social media, as well 
as via email to all registered users (including all prior or current backers and creators registered 
on the website).  
We present evidence on the different means used by Kickstarter to publicize its new terms 
of use in Figure OA-5. Given the extensive coverage and wide reach of the announcement, we 
believe it is very unlikely that Kickstarter’s registered users, social media followers, backers, 





1.2. Media Coverage of the Change in Kickstarter’s Terms of Use 
We conduct an in-depth analysis of the (mainstream and tech-dedicated) media coverage 
of the change in terms of use. This rule change drew the attention of both types of media and 
led to extensive discussions on how the new terms of use would alleviate moral hazard 
problems by introducing the possibility of legal action by backers. Table OA-1 presents a 
collection of excerpts from articles announcing and describing the change in terms of use. 
These articles specifically emphasize the increased litigation risk faced by project creators. 
Naturally, tech-dedicated outlets, such as TechCrunch, Ars Technica, Polygon, 
Engadget, SlashGear, and CNET, make up for a substantial portion of the press coverage. In 
fact, a Washington Post article highlights that much of the news coverage related to Kickstarter 
is usually in “news blogs devoted to nerd culture.” Many of these outlets have a very large 
readership. Table OA-2 presents web traffic estimates for the online publications listed in Table 
OA-1. TechCrunch (a Bay Area online publisher focusing on technology news and profiling 
of new tech businesses and products), for example, has more than 25 million monthly visits. 
Ars Technica, Polygon, and Engadget, which are somewhat similar and mainly cover news on 
technology, video games, and consumer electronics, are estimated to have 30, 34, and 37 
million monthly visits, respectively. CNET.com, in turn, had approximately 166 million visits 
per month in February 2019 (330 million visits at the time of the change in Kickstarter’s terms 
of use). CNET’s web traffic is comparable to that of the Washington Post. This type of outlets 
is of particular interest to the typical Kickstarter creator and backer. In fact, according to 
Quantcast, a company which specializes in the measurement of websites’ audience, the typical 
Kickstarter.com visitor from 2012 to 2014 read TechCrunch.1  
                                                            
1 Quantcast stopped measuring and tracking the audience of Kickstarter.com in 2014. We retrieve Kickstarter’s 
traffic and demographic statistics published by Quantcast from 2012 to 2014 using the Wayback Machine. 
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These tech-outlets emphasized to a large extent the increased legal liability of creators 
and the increased legal protection of backers. For example, on September 19, 2014, 
TechCrunch published an article stating: 
“Kickstarter also reminds creators that they need to be “honest” and not 
make “material misrepresentations in their communication to backers.” (In 
other words, scammers beware.) Additionally, the terms now state that 
creators who are unable to stand by the promises they made in their project 
may be subject to legal action by backers.” 
 
Other online publications followed suit, with Polygon and SlashGear, for example, 
emphasizing that creators not delivering rewards “open themselves up to possible legal action 
from backers” and respectively using the following headlines to advertise the change: 
“Kickstarter updates terms to address creators who fail to deliver on their projects” and 
“Kickstarter changes rules so nobody runs off with your money.”  
While this change naturally received more attention from online outlets devoted to 
technology and gaming, it was also covered by the mainstream media, including NBC News, 
Time Magazine, and the Washington Post.2 For example, NBC News reported: 
 “Kickstarter is trying to codify the current swampy situation around projects 
canceled after creators have the cash in hand. (…) If creators don’t make 
good on the promises made in their campaigns, they must explain what 
happened, return any unused funds, and could face potential legal action 
from backers.” 
 
Time Magazine highlighted the difference between moral hazard problems (i.e., making 
deceitful disclosures and then taking the money and running) and bad business decisions, 
clarifying that the former may lead to legal action following the rule change: 
“In the event that a scammer takes everyone’s money and runs, Kickstarter 
won’t offer a refund or even chip in for legal fees. But at least in those cases 
there’s a clear basis for taking legal action (fraud); when money is 
squandered in a more conventional way — through bad business decisions 
— funders have no recourse at all.” 
                                                            
2 The subsequent 2015 actions by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) against Erik Chevalier (the creator of 
“The Doom That Came To Atlantic City”) and by the Washington State Attorney General against Ed Nash (the 
creator of “Asylum Playing Cards”) were also extensively covered by both specialized blogs and the mainstream 




Collectively, the analysis of the media coverage suggests that the media found the change 
in terms of use to be meaningful and consequential and to have implications for creator 
accountability and backer protection.  
 
1.3. Reactions to the Change in Kickstarter’s Terms of Use on Twitter 
To gain additional insights into how backers and creators perceived the rule change, we 
next investigate whether and how the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use was discussed on 
social media. We believe this type of analysis can bring. In Figure OA-6, we present a 
collection of “tweets” surrounding the rule change. These tweets provide interesting anecdotal 
evidence on how potential backers and creators reacted to the change in Kickstarter’s terms of 
use. Several Twitter users highlighted the importance of the change. For example: 
@icotom: “@kickstarter has updated their TOS. Very 
interesting read, quite important clarifications” 
@PixelPiracyGame: “Seems like a HUGE step forward for 
@Kickstarter” 
 
More importantly, several users emphasized the heightened creator accountability: 
@milesmaker: “Kickstarter’s New Rules: You can’t just take your $ 
and run. Complete projects, or fess up!” 
 
Others emphasized how the new rules protect backers: 
@ElanAmran: “#Kickstarter Releases New #Crowdfunding Rules to 
Protect Buyers” 
@LK617: “New #Kickstarter terms of use protect backers when 
projects fail” 
@booksofm: “I wonder if the new Kickstarter Terms of Use basically 
means if you don’t deliver what you promise you are 
open to a Class Action” 
 
Combined, the anecdotal evidence presented in Sections 1.1 to 1.3 supports our 
assumption that (potential) backers and creators were indeed aware of the rule change and its 
implications in terms of increased creator legal liability and backer legal protection. In fact, 
given the way in which Kickstarter disclosed the change in terms of use, the coverage of this 
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change by mainstream and specialized media outlets, and the discussion that ensued on social 
media, it is unlikely that users of Kickstarter were unaware of the rule change and its 
implications. Nevertheless, in Section 1.4, we conduct a series of empirical tests to provide 
further support to the key underlying assumption of our research design. 
 
1.4. FTC Consumer Complaints and Backer Comments 
To offer further support to our maintained assumption that the change in Kickstarter’s 
terms of use changed the perceptions of creators and backers regarding the applicability of pre-
existing state consumer protection regulation to reward crowdfunding, we conduct two sets of 
empirical tests. First, we investigate whether the number of consumer complaints increases 
following the introduction of the new terms of use. Second, we check backer comments to 
examine whether, following the introduction of the new terms of use and the resulting increase 
in creator legal liability, backer satisfaction increases and the number of fraudulent campaigns 
and projects with delayed reward delivery decreases. 
We made a request to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) for a list of all consumer complaints involving the Kickstarter 
platform. The list we obtained from the FTC includes 369 complaints made as of September 4, 
2018. While project names and backer (consumer) identifying information are unavailable to 
us because redacted, the file we received from the FTC contains information regarding the 
address (and state) of each consumer making a complaint. This information allows us to test 
whether the number of consumer complaints increases following the change in Kickstarter’s 
terms of use, and whether this increase is more pronounced in states with stricter consumer 
protection laws, consistent with the role of consumer protection becoming more salient to 
backers subsequent to the rule change.3 
                                                            
3 Note that these are federal (and not state) consumer complaints. Nonetheless, we expect to find a large increase 




The increase in consumer complaints appears evident from simple descriptive statistics: 
backers made 51 complaints to the FTC in the 64 months preceding the change in terms of use 
and 315 complaints in the 59 months that followed it (three additional complaints were made 
in the month of the rule change, September 2014). 
To further examine whether the effect of the change in terms of use varies across states 
with different levels of consumer protection, we regress the number of complaints by state and 
year-month on the interaction term . Our model specification includes state 
and year-month fixed effects to control for state and year-month unobservable factors and, 
therefore, excludes the main effects of  and , as these variables are collinear with 
the state and year-month fixed effects, respectively. The results of this analysis are presented 
in Column (1) of Table OA-3. The coefficient on  is positive and significant, 
suggesting that, following the change in terms of use, the number of consumer complaints 
increases in states with stronger consumer protection laws. In untabulated tests, we further 
control for the number of projects in each state and year. The statistical significance and 
economic magnitude of the coefficient on  remain unchanged. 
To assess whether the change in consumer protection was followed by an improvement 
in backer satisfaction and a decrease in the number of projects with delayed reward delivery 
and projects that bakers allege as fraudulent, we conduct a textual analysis of backer comments. 
We restrict our analysis to comments made by backers of successfully-funded projects after the 
end of the funding period. We begin by estimating the sentiment of backer comments for each 
funded project and compute the average backer sentiment of all projects in a given state and 
year-month. We then identify comments that mention the terms “fraud,” “delay,” and/or 
respective synonyms, and compute the percentage of successfully-funded projects in a given 
state and year-month with comments that include each of these sets of words. Our empirical 
tests, reported in Columns (2) to (4) of Table OA-3, suggest an increase in the sentiment of 
backers, a lower incidence of reward delivery delays, and a lower percentage of projects with 
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fraud allegations in states with stricter consumer protection following the change in terms of 
use.  
The combined anecdotal and empirical evidence presented in this section strongly backs 
our assumption that perceptions of creator legal liability and backer legal protection indeed 
changed following the introduction of Kickstarter’s new terms of use. 
 
2. Why Did Kickstarter Change Its Terms of Use? 
In this section, we discuss potential factors that may have influenced Kickstarter’s 
decision to revise its terms of use and how we control for these factors in our empirical analysis. 
When Kickstarter announced the change in terms of use on its blog, it indicated that the goal 
of the change was to “make sure every part of the Kickstarter system is clear and 
straightforward.” An analysis of Twitter activity, Google searches, news articles, and websites 
related to technology and crowdfunding suggests that the change in terms of use may have been 
prompted by the negative coverage received by a set of highly-publicized projects that may 
have led Kickstarter to consider potential reputational costs. This idea is echoed by some of the 
Twitter activity surrounding the change. For example: 
@isatismktg: “Popular #crowdfunding website Kickstarter 
introducing new rules to improve confidence.” 
 
In the months preceding the rule change, the number of Google searches for Kickstarter 
rules increased (see Figure OA-7). This increasing interest suggests that the decision to clarify 
the nature of the contract between backers and creators, and clearly spell out the possibility of 
legal action, may have been driven by increased uncertainty regarding the rights and 
obligations of backers and creators, respectively.  
Another related factor that may have played a role is Kickstarter’s desire to clarify that 
the platform bears no legal responsibility for funded projects that do not deliver rewards. In 
fact, the new terms of use specifically state: “Kickstarter is not part of this contract — the 
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contract is a direct legal agreement between creators and their backers.” They further include 
a section titled “Stuff we don’t do and aren’t responsible for,” in which Kickstarter specifically 
states that they “don’t oversee the performance or punctuality of projects” and “don’t endorse 
any content users submit to the Site.” 
To assess whether the change in terms of use might have been triggered also by other 
factors, we further examine the volume of web traffic on Kickstarter.com (Figure OA-8). While 
web traffic had been steadily increasing since the creation of the website in 2009, it experienced 
a deceleration in growth, or even a slight decline, in the months that preceded the change in 
terms of use. Web traffic then increased again following the change. This pattern could also be 
consistent with increased uncertainty regarding the contractual arrangement between backers 
and creators and their respective rights and obligations, which was then resolved by the rule 
change. We do not control for this last set of factors (Google searches, web traffic, and number 
of projects receiving negative attention) in our analysis as these are effectively subsumed by 
our subcategory×year-month fixed effects.4  
Finally, in Figure OA-9, we report Kickstarter’s aggregate goal and amount pledged. 
Note that the main source of Kickstarter’s revenues are the fees it receives for successfully-
funded projects. These fees are defined as a percentage of the total amount pledged by backers. 
While Kickstarter had been experiencing an increase in the total goal amount (i.e., the total 
amount of funds requested by creators) leading up to the change in terms of use, this increase 
was not accompanied by a comparable increase in the amount of funds pledged by backers. It 
is possible, therefore, that the change in rules was also driven by a relative decrease in amount 
pledged.5 As this could be a potentially important trigger of the rule change whose effect would 
not be absorbed by our fixed effects structure, we include lagged aggregate amount pledged as 
                                                            
4 Note that Google Trends data and web traffic data are only available at the aggregate year-month level. 
5 Note that, in absolute terms, amount pledged continued to increase throughout our sample period. 
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a percentage of aggregate goal amount at the state and year-level as an additional control in our 
model specifications.6  
 
3. Disclosure and Project Success by Size 
In Table OA-4, we examine the extent to which the association between project success 
and disclosure is observed across different project size (i.e., funding goal) categories. We find 
that project success exhibits a positive and significant association with disclosure across all 
size categories. A one standard deviation increase in the length of the campaign pitch (risks 
and challenges section) is associated with a 1.2 to 2.0 (0.8 to 2.3) percentage points increase in 
probability of success and a U.S. $146 to U.S. $955 (U.S. $111 to U.S. $465) increase in 
amount pledged.  
 
4. Additional Robustness Tests 
In this section, we present a set of sensitivity tests assessing the robustness of our 
findings. Our main analyses are based on the location of the project (as opposed to the location 
of the project backers). This research design choice is supported by the following two 
arguments. First, if a creator is a resident of a given state and does substantial business (i.e., it 
markets, advertises, distributes, sells, and receives substantial profits from sales) within that 
state, then the appropriate venue for a consumer protection lawsuit would be that specific state. 
Second, prior literature documents a significant home-bias even though crowdfunding is not 
geographically constrained (Agrawal et al., 2011, Lin and Viswanathan, 2015). Nevertheless, 
to the extent that certain project locations are different from the location of their backers, 
location may be measured with error.7 To alleviate this concern, we conduct a sensitivity test 
in which we limit our sample to projects for which most backers reside in the project state.  
                                                            
6 In the model specifications presented in Table 4, Panel C of the paper, our state×year-month fixed effects 
effectively absorb the effect of lagged aggregate amount pledged. 
7 Note that, for our identification to lead to a biased estimate of the effect of the rule change, the proportion of 
backers located outside of the project state would have to be correlated with the treatment. 
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Kickstarter provides information (in the community tab) on the top 10 cities in which 
backers are located, as well as on the number of backers in each of these cities. Based on these 
data, we compute the percentage of project backers that hail from the project state. Note that 
our measure is conservative, as we are only able to observe backers in the top 10 cities. We 
limit our sample to projects for which more than 50% of backers are in the project state. Table 
OA-5, Panel A, presents the results of this analysis. We find that the coefficient on our variable 
of interest, , is positive and significant across all disclosure and 
project success proxies. The fact that we observe an increase in the credibility of the campaign 
pitch (risks and challenges section) in this subsample of 30,351 (22,585) observations increases 
our confidence in the robustness of our main findings.  
Moreover, because some of the projects in our sample have been cancelled or suspended, 
project success may also be measured with error. When a project is cancelled or suspended by 
Kickstarter or directly by creators, the reason for the lack of success may not be related to the 
unwillingness of backers to support that project. Yet, in our main analysis we code such 
projects as unfunded (i.e.,  is equal to 0). To alleviate the concern that our findings 
may be driven by potential measurement error, we conduct further sensitivity tests in which we 
exclude cancelled and suspended projects from our sample. Table OA-5, Panel B, reports the 
results of these tests. The coefficient on the interaction term  
remains significantly positive across all disclosure and project success proxies also within this 
smaller subsample. 
Finally, some creators may return to Kickstarter multiple times with different projects 
hence building reputation. The effect of disclosure on project success may thus be confounded 
by the performance of creators in previous campaigns. To allay this concern, in Table OA-5, 
Panel C, we limit our sample to projects of first-time creators. We continue to find an increase 




5. Treatment Effect Stability 
While the different fixed effects structures that we employ in the tests presented in Table 
4, Panel C and the results of our cross-sectional tests presented in Table 6 already alleviate, to 
a great extent, a potential omitted variable bias in our empirical analysis, in this section we 
implement the bounding methodology proposed by Oster (2019) to assess the stability of our 
treatment effects and evaluate their robustness to omitted variable bias.  
Specifically, we re-estimate our main model specifications (Table 3, Panel A, Columns 
(2) and (4) and Table 3, Panel B, Columns (1) and (2) of the paper) with and without project, 
creator, and macro-level control variables. We then assume a value for Rmax (the R2 from a 
hypothetical regression of the outcome on treatment and both observed and unobserved control 
variables) and, based on this assumption, calculate the value of delta (the relative degree of 
selection on observed and unobserved control variables) for which the treatment effect would 
be zero. Delta is a function of Rmax and the change in the coefficient on 
 and R2 as the control variables are included in the regression. Following Oster 
(2019), we set Rmax equal to 1.3 multiplied by the R2 of the regression that includes all control 
variables. We present the results of this analysis in Table OA-6. Our deltas range from 1.7 to 
2.7 (across the different disclosure and funding variables). This suggests that, depending on the 
disclosure and funding variable, the unobservables would need to be 1.7 to 2.7 times as 
important as the observables to produce a treatment effect of zero. When Rmax is set more 
conservatively to 1.5 multiplied by the R2 of the controlled regression, deltas range from 1 to 
1.5 (untabulated). The magnitude of these deltas provides further reassurance that the treatment 
effect that we document is unlikely to be driven by omitted variables. 
 
6. Additional Evidence on Disclosure Changes 
Our analysis of the type of language used in project disclosures is based on lists of words. 
As these lists necessarily involve some discretion, we also examine the keyness (i.e., the 
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relative frequency of words) in the campaign pitch and risks and challenges section for projects 
starting before and after the rule change. Figure OA-10 plots the highest values of the χ2-test 
statistic for differences in the frequency of words in the “pre” and “post” period. Following the 
change in Kickstarter’s terms of use, creators increasingly use words such as “product,” 
“campaign,” “business,” “manufacturing,” “shipping,” “risk,” and “documentation” in their 
campaign pitches. The type of words used in the risks and challenges section also appears to 
change, with words such as “report,” “accountability,” “learn,” “check,” “questions,” 
“campaign,” being, for example, more frequently used. In line with our main findings, the 
evidence emerging from this additional analysis points to an increase in the use of legal, as 
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Figure OA-1: Example of Kickstarter Project 
 










Figure OA-1 (continued) 
 




Exhibit D: Backer Comments 
 
This figure presents excerpts of the Knocki project webpage on Kickstarter 
(https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/knocki/knocki-make-any-surface-smart). Exhibits A, B, and C contain 
snippets of the campaign tab. Exhibit A presents information on project location, category, funding goal, amount 
pledged, number of backers, and rewards. Exhibits B and C show excerpts of the campaign pitch and risks and 
challenges section, respectively. Exhibit D provides a snapshot of the project’s comments tab.
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Figure OA-2: Number of Projects 
 
 
This figure shows the extent of variation in total number of projects on Kickstarter across U.S. states. Dark (light) 
blue areas indicate a larger (smaller) number of projects. 
 
 
Figure OA-3: Average Successful Projects 
 
 
This figure shows the extent of variation in the average number of successful Kickstarter projects across U.S. 
states. Dark (light) blue areas indicate a higher (lower) average number of successful projects.
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Figure OA-4: Total Amount Pledged 
 
 
This figure shows the extent of variation in total amount pledged to projects on Kickstarter across U.S. states. Dark 
(light) blue areas indicate a higher (lower) total amount pledged. 
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Figure OA-5: Kickstarter’s Announcement of Its New Terms of Use 
 








Figure OA-5 (continued) 
 
Exhibit C: Email to Kickstarter’s Users 
 
 
This figure presents Kickstarter’s announcement of the change in its terms of use on its website (Exhibit A), on 

























This figure depicts the Google search interest in the United States for Kickstarter rules relative to the highest 



























































































































































This figure shows the estimated number of desktop and mobile sessions on Kickstarter’s website, in millions 


















































































































































This figure shows the total goal amount and total amount pledged for our sample projects, in U.S. dollars (Source: 
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Figure OA-10: Keyness of Project Disclosures 
 
Panel A: Campaign Pitch 
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Figure OA-10 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Risks and Challenges Section 
 
This figure compares the relative word frequencies in the campaign pitch (Panel A) and in the risks and 
challenges section (Panel B) before (‘Pre’) and after (‘Post’) the change in Kickstarter’s terms of use.
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Table OA-1: Excerpts from Articles Covering the Change in Kickstarter’s Terms of Use 
 
 



















“Kickstarter is revising its terms of use in an effort to clarify 
the relationship between project creators and backers, and in 
particular, to spell out the responsibilities that creators have 
to their backers, the company announced today. 
(…)Kickstarter considers the backing arrangement to be a 
binding legal agreement between creators and backers, with 
creators being legally obligated to fulfill the project and any 
associated rewards.(…) the terms of use explicitly warn 
creators that if they don't meet those standards, they open 















“If you’ve ever back a crowd-funded campaign, you know that 
feeling you get just after submitting your cash. It sometimes 
comes back months later, when the project goes off the rails or 
hits a snag. Will you ever see the thing you paid for? 



















“In Section 4 of Kickstarter’s revised Terms of Use, the 
company now explains that when customers are backing a 
project, they’re creating a legal agreement between themselves 
and the project creators, not with Kickstarter. (…) Kickstarter 
also reminds creators that they need to be “honest” and not 
make “material misrepresentations in their communication to 
backers. (In other words, scammers beware.) Additionally, the 
terms now state that creators who are unable to stand by the 
promises they made in their project may be subject to legal 
action by backers. (The possibility of legal action has always 





















“That’s what Kickstarter describes in an update made to its 
terms of service today. According to the changes, “Anyone 
who backs a project is accepting the creator’s offer, and 
forming that contract. Kickstarter is not a part of this 
contract,” reads the new terms of service. (…) Kickstarter 
cautions, however, that doing the above may not 



















“Today, Kickstarter announced that it has revised its Terms to 
make them more readable and to include an entire section that 
spells out creators’ obligations to their backers. The section, 
entitled “How Projects Work,” puts this duty in language that 
leaves less room for interpretation. “When a project is 
successfully funded, the creator must complete the project and 
fulfill each reward,” reads the updated Terms (bolding in 
original text). “Once a creator has done so, they’ve satisfied 
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“Now the service is trying to clean things up with a new terms 
of service agreement that it hopes will lend more confidence to 
potential backers. That should be a good thing for customers, 
and Kickstarter spells things out pretty clearly. “For the 
overwhelming majority of projects, it’s pretty simple: creators 
finish the work they planned, backers are happy, and nobody 
sweats the details. But there are exceptions. Sometimes 
problems come up, projects don’t go according to plan, and 
people wind up in the dark about what’s supposed to happen 
next. So we’re spelling it out-- what’s expected from backers, 
what’s expected from creators, and what needs to happen if a 





ty. A hefty 
overhaul of 
Kickstarter’







es of not 
fulfilling 











“The crowdfunding website has recently updated its terms of 
use to clarify creator obligations -- including the obligation to 
issue a refund if the creator cannot deliver on promised 
rewards and the possibility of legal action from backers. 
Previously, the old terms of use buried this information in a 
wall of text. “Project Creators agree to make a good faith 
attempt to fulfill each reward by its Estimated Delivery Date,” 
it stated in one point; and, in another, “Kickstarter does not 
offer refunds. A Project Creator is not required to grant a 
Backer's request for a refund unless the Project Creator is 
unable or unwilling to fulfill the reward. Project Creators are 
required to fulfill all rewards of their successful fundraising 
campaigns or refund any Backer whose reward they do not or 
cannot fulfill.” The updated terms of use, which have also been 
edited with clearer language and page layout, expand on this 


















“Crowdfunding campaigns can help turn creators’ dreams 
into reality -- unless backers hand over the money, just to 
watch everything fall apart. Now Kickstarter is trying to codify 
the current swampy situation around projects canceled after 
creators have the cash in hand. Kickstarter's new policies 
mandate that creators complete their projects, or at least make 
their best effort to bring the project to the “best possible 
conclusion for backers.” If creators don't make good on the 
promises made in their campaigns, they must explain what 
happened, return any unused funds, and could face potential 
















“Section 4 of the new terms of service goes to lengths to help 
project creators set themselves up for success and/or not 
frustrate their backers. If the creators can't deliver, Kickstarter 
explains how to try and make good when the creators do not 




Table OA-1 (continued) 
 
 
















“Kickstarter updated its terms of use late last week, mostly 
cleaning up the site's fine-print language to better spell out the 
relationship between project creators and backers (…) The 
boldest inclusion stressed that creators who are unable to 
satisfy the terms “may be subject to legal action by backers.” 
While Kickstarter still won't involve itself in the proceedings, 
this opens a clearer lane for possible lawsuits from project 
backers should creators fail to live up to their agreement or 
























“Kickstarter lays down new rules for when a project fails. Just 
because a Kickstarter raises funds, that doesn’t mean it will 
ultimately succeed. And now, Casey Johnston and Ars 
Technica reports, the crowdfunding platform has updated its 
terms of use with guidance for what to do when a project fails. 
"In that event, creators are expected to explain what is 
happening and how the money was used, giving refunds to any 
backers who request them. Kickstarter also writes that, in lieu 
of giving refunds, backers can “explain how those funds will 
be used to complete the project in some alternate form.” which 
















“The section ends with the most important part: “If [the 
creator is] unable to satisfy the terms of this agreement, they 
may be subject to legal action by backers.” I’m not aware of 
any videogame backers currently pursuing legal action 
against a failed project, but this might give people a stronger 
leg to stand upon should they choose to. Kickstarter is great, 
but as John pointed out, backing a project is not the same thing 
as buying a game. It’s a risky investment, and while individual 
pledges tend to be in low enough amounts that no single person 
is accepting much risk, failures are inevitable. I’m glad 
therefore that Kickstarter have written something that backers 
can point to when developers occasionally fail to deliver or fall 
silent for protracted periods of time.” 
09/22/2014 It just got 














“Kickstarter has decided to update its famously laissez-faire 
attitude when it comes to protecting donors who have pledged 
more than $1 billion through the company over the years. The 
new terms state that a successfully funded campaign that fails 
to produce “rewards,” i.e. the product, may have to “return 
remaining funds.” If not, they could be “subject to legal action 
by backers.” Backers could previously sue campaign creators, 
but rarely did so. The new rules, which go into effect on 
October 19th, make the potential for a lawsuit more explicit 
(check out the differences here). The amended TOS says that 
by backing a project, donors are entering into a “contract” 
with creators. Kickstarter then lists all the things a creator has 
to do if a product does not materialize, including “offer to 
return any remaining funds.” If creators fails to bring the 
contract to the “best possible conclusion,” the “legal action” 
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“Kickstarter is no longer the risk-free testing ground many an 
inexperienced entrepreneur once thought it was. Thanks to 
changes to the Brooklyn, New York-based crowdfunding site's 
Terms of Use, the possible repercussions to irresponsible 
business managers are now quite clear, as are the steps to 
avoid getting caught on the wrong side of a swarm of angry 
backers (...) In case there is any confusion about the future role 
Kickstarter may or may not play (...) the new terms make it 
clear that when a creator and a supporter enter into an 
agreement through the exchange of funds the contract doesn't 
include Kickstarter. “If they're unable to satisfy the terms of 



















“These new terms echo those which were in place, but are 
more strongly worded. That final term is key: “The creator is 
solely responsible for fulfilling the promises made in their 
project. If they're unable to satisfy the terms of this agreement, 














“These rules are intended to clarify a creator’s accountability 
and what they should do to avoid getting sued, when/if their 
projects fail. This change will let the backer understand why a 
certain project failed and they will also be able to understand 
every action that the creator took during the course of the 
project (…) These changes will be in effect from the 19th 
October 2014, and these stipulations ensure that creators 
avoid any legal action if they are unable to finish their project. 


















“Recently, Kickstarter appeared to respond to the bad press 
by revising its terms of service. The new document does a 
better job of laying out the responsibilities creators have to 
their backers. No scamming, do your best, try to make it up to 
people if you fail, and so on. But that move likely won’t fix the 
deeper problem: That most of the site’s users believe that their 
donations entitle them to some kind of tangible reward, be it a 
smart watch or a bamboo beer koozie. In reality, nothing of 
the sort is guaranteed. That’s because Kickstarter backers 
aren’t customers making a purchase. They’re investors. And 
like all investments, Kickstarter projects have a chance of 
going bust. (...)Backers generally have limited information 
about the people they are supporting. And once a project is 
funded, they’re on their own when it comes to enforcing 
contracts with a creators — to the extent that such contracts 
even exist. In the event that a scammer takes everyone’s money 
and runs, Kickstarter won’t offer a refund or even chip in for 
legal fees. But at least in those cases there’s a clear basis for 
taking legal action (fraud); when money is squandered in a 
more conventional way — through bad business decisions — 
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“Kickstarter, the donation-based crowdfunding platform, 
recently made an important change to its Terms of Service. 
Specifically, Kickstarter attempted to address the problem of 
project creators failing to follow through with the project that 
backers supported. Kickstarter did not mince words in its new 
Terms of Service, stating: The creator is solely responsible for 
fulfilling the promises made in their project. If they’re unable 
to satisfy the terms of this agreement, they may be subject to 
legal action by backers. (...)If you are creating a project, 
however, this should be a clear message: do not make 
promises you cannot keep. With Kickstarter’s new Terms of 
Service, starting a project and fraudulently accepting 
donations may expose creators to real liability.” 
This table reports a collection of excerpts from online articles announcing and describing the change in 
Kickstarter’s terms of use. These articles specifically clarify the extent of increased threat of litigation faced by 





Table OA-2: Web Traffic of Publications Covering the Change in Kickstarter’s Terms 
of Use 
 



















This table presents the estimated number of desktop and mobile sessions (in thousands) for the websites listed in 





Table OA-3: FTC Consumer Complaints and Backer Comments 
 
 Dependent variable:  Dependent variable:  Dependent variable:  Dependent variable: 
        
 Independent variables: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.003**  0.002**  -0.001**  -0.002* 
 (2.52)  (2.37)  (-2.63)  (-1.99) 
State fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year-month fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 5,763  4,144  4,738  4,738 
Adj. R2 0.152  0.047  0.177  0.124 
This table presents the results of the analysis that assesses the effects of the introduction of Kickstarter’s new terms of use on the perception of creator legal liability and backer 
legal protection. Data are aggregated at the state and year level. The dependent variable is the number of consumer complaints in Column (1), the average sentiment of backer 
comments for successful (i.e., funded) projects in Column (2), the percentage of successful projects with backers discussing delays in Column (3), and the percentage of 
successful projects with fraud allegations by backers in Column (4). All model specifications are estimated using OLS and include state and year-month fixed effects. The table 
reports (in parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table OA-4: Disclosure and Project Success by Size 
 
Panel A: Probability of Success 
 Dependent variable:   
 Disclosure variable: 	   Disclosure variable:  
 Extra Small Small Medium Large  Extra Small Small Medium Large 
 Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.020*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.038***  0.043*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.016*** 
 (7.15) (11.17) (7.10) (7.27)  (14.08) (9.23) (7.02) (4.21) 
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Creator Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 108,724 50,823 26,528 68,942  75,526 36,412 20,131 56,846 
Adj. R2 0.330 0.424 0.481 0.404  0.360 0.448 0.495 0.406 
 
Panel B: Amount Pledged  
 Dependent variable:   
 Disclosure variable: 	   Disclosure variable:  
 Extra Small Small Medium Large  Extra Small Small Medium Large 
 Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
0.252*** 0.396*** 0.442*** 0.575***  0.219*** 0.302*** 0.313*** 0.322*** 
 (13.02) (12.08) (15.22) (22.79)  (9.03) (14.65) (6.50) (8.73) 
Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Creator controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 108,724 50,823 26,528 68,942 75,526 36,412 20,131 56,846 
Adj. R2 0.267 0.410 0.512 0.479  0.289 0.438 0.534 0.483 
This table presents the results of the analysis that examines how the association between disclosure and project success varies according to project size. Extra small projects 
have a funding goal below U.S. $5,000, Small projects have a funding goal that ranges between U.S. $5,000 and U.S. $10,000, Medium projects have a funding goal that ranges 
between U.S. $10,000 and U.S. $15,000, and Large projects have a funding goal above U.S. $15,000. In Panel A (Panel B) the dependent variable is	  ( ). 
In both panels,  is measured as 	  and 	 	  in Columns (1) to (4) and (5) to (8), respectively. All model specifications 
are estimated using OLS and include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects. The table reports (in 
parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix B of the paper. 
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Table OA-5: Additional Robustness Tests 
 
Panel A: Intrastate Backers 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
      
 Independent variables: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
-0.026  0.003  0.009  0.010 
 (-1.64)  (0.18)  (0.24)  (0.29) 
-0.020***  -0.012***  -0.081***  -0.056*** 
 (-4.38)  (-2.78)  (-5.75)  (-5.06) 
-0.004  -0.008  -0.040***  -0.054*** 
 (-0.76)  (-1.26)  (-3.57)  (-3.58) 
 -0.001  -0.002  -0.004  -0.005 
 (-0.61)  (-0.96)  (-1.03)  (-1.18) 
 0.003***  0.003***  0.013***  0.012*** 
 (4.33)  (3.44)  (5.80)  (4.54) 
Project controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Creator controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Macro controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 30,351  22,585  30,351  22,585 
Adj. R2 0.435  0.442  0.486  0.497 
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Table OA-5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Excluding Cancelled and Suspended Projects 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
      
 Independent variables: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.012***  0.020***  0.348***  0.220*** 
 (2.89)  (4.82)  (8.59)  (4.60) 
-0.025***  -0.011***  -0.142***  -0.096*** 
 (-7.45)  (-3.76)  (-6.41)  (-4.61) 
0.002  -0.000  0.027  0.024 
 (0.59)  (-0.10)  (0.82)  (0.62) 
 -0.000  -0.000  -0.004  -0.005 
 (-0.18)  (-0.11)  (-0.83)  (-1.15) 
 0.004***  0.002***  0.025***  0.023*** 
 (7.35)  (3.68)  (6.52)  (5.05) 
Project controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Creator controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Macro controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 235,474  173,832  235,474  173,832 




Table OA-5 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Excluding Projects of Creators that Have Launched Other Projects in the Past 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
      
 Independent variables: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
0.005  0.013***  0.335***  0.189*** 
 (1.24)  (2.95)  (8.54)  (3.74) 
-0.024***  -0.009***  -0.158***  -0.090*** 
 (-6.27)  (-3.14)  (-5.17)  (-3.08) 
-0.001  -0.003  0.011  0.001 
 (-0.18)  (-1.44)  (0.28)  (0.03) 
 0.000  0.000  -0.003  -0.003 
 (0.82)  (0.57)  (-0.70)  (-0.52) 
 0.004***  0.002***  0.027***  0.022*** 
 (6.40)  (3.39)  (5.49)  (3.66) 
Project controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Creator controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Macro Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
State fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Subcategory × Year-month fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs. 196,277  141,154  196,277  141,154 
Adj. R2 0.351  0.353  0.330  0.350 
This table presents the results of three robustness tests. In Panel A, we limit the sample to projects for which more than 50% of the top 10 backers are from the respective 
project’s state. In Panel B, we exclude from the sample those projects that have been cancelled or suspended. In Panel C, we exclude projects of creators that have previously 
launched other projects on Kickstarter. In all panels, the dependent variable is  in Columns (1) and (2) and  in Columns (3) and (4) and  is 
measured as 	  in odd-numbered columns and 	 	  in even-numbered columns. All model specifications are estimated using OLS 
and include project, creator, and macro-level control variables, as well as state and subcategory×year-month fixed effects. The table reports (in parentheses) t-statistics based 
on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by state and year-month. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix B of the paper.
38 
 
Table OA-6: Treatment Effect Stability 
 
 
 Dependent variable:   Dependent variable:  
 Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable:  Disclosure variable: 
      
 Independent variables: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 0.0058  0.0039  0.0361  0.0374 
0.1795  0.1838  0.2288  0.2129 
	 0.0036  0.0019  0.0246  0.0227 
		 0.3540  0.3658  0.3314  0.3522 
∆ 2.7266  1.6496  2.2108  2.0464 
This table presents an estimate of the value of Delta (∆), the relative degree of selection on observed and unobserved control variables for which the treatment effect would be 
zero, following the methodology developed by Oster (2019). The table presents the coefficient on the interaction term  and the R2 from the 
estimation of our main specification (Table 3, Panel A, Columns (2) and (4) and Table 3, Panel B, Columns (1) and (2)) of the paper with ( , ) and without 
( , ) project, creator, and macro-level control variables. Following the methodology proposed by Oster (2019) we set Rmax (the R2 from a hypothetical 
regression of the outcome on treatment and both observed and unobserved control variables) equal to 1.3 multiplied by the R2 of the regression that includes all control variables 
(i.e., the controlled regression).  
